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AN IDEAL OF PERSONAL GROWTH IMPLIED IN THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF JUNG AND THE METAPHYSICS OF WHITEHEAD
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF THE THESIS
A. The nature of the problem.
An ideal of personal growth is meaningless apart from its function
in the experience of the individual who acknowledges it as a guide for his
thought and conduct. The problem of a thesis which is to deal with
personal growth is two-fold. First, the function of rational desires in
empirical
the experience of mere^value must be analyzed and interpreted. Secondly,
if an ideal of personal growth is implied as an integral factor in
rational values, then a consistent principle for the purposive realization
of that ideal should be explicitly formulated and tested for its objective
validity.
By the very nature of the problem, an adequate interpretation can
be derived only from a variety of sources. Since the treatment of ideals
involves both psychology and metaphysics, Jung and Whitehead are selected
as a psychologist and a metaphysician whose methods are mutually com-
patible and whose views are relevant to this problem. Their compatibility
and relevance will be indicated in this preliminary investigation after
the nature of the problem, the criterion to be used, and the methodological
perspective for procedure have been explained.
An understanding of the nature of the problem depends to a great
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extent upon the definition of individual experience embodying the data
from which rational principles of interpretation are to be derived.
The following definition furnishes such a starting-point:
Experience, here, shall mean the whole field of consciousness,
every process or state of awareness within it; not sensation
alone, nor scientifically interpreted experience alone ....
Experience is always complex, ongoing conscious activity;
thought and will belong to it as truly as do sensation and
memory image.
Although it is necessary for scientific method to organize sense data
by an arbitrary disconnection of sense experience from value and person-
ality, for philosophic method so to limit the realm of experience from
which the evidence for this inouiry is derived, is not only unnecessary
but impossible, if this investigation is to proceed.
There are certain tentative assumptions that seem to be in
accordance with this definition of experience which we have adopted here.
If ideal values are to be investigated, it must be by considering their
function in the experience of individual selves. Consecuently, if the
realization of ideal values in human personality should be considered
evidence of finite freedom and Infinite Purpose, any data suggesting the
possibility of goodness, truth, beauty, and holiness must be derived
from the same concrete individual experience which embodies sensation
and self-consciousness. It is necessary, therefore, that these two
questions should be considered centrs.1 to this study: What is the
evidence of the function of ideal values in the experiential process of
1
Brightman, ML, 56.
•
• '
.
'
:
•
...
-
.
'
'
.
.
.
*
i
-
• ||
—
.
.
,
.
-j ' '
—
2
knowing? is it possible that the concrete realization of ideal values
in human personality might disclose an objective aspect of the process of
3
being?
B. The criterion of coherence.
In approaching the problem with a synoptic method this inouiry will
use the criterion of coherence. Here coherence will mean the systematic
consistency of the relations embodied in the content of reflective self-
consciousness. This will require that these relations of fact and value
which are embodied in conscious awareness should be free from all logical
contradiction; and, in addition, as inclusive experience as possible should
be considered in deriving those concepts which can be consistently inter-
preted. Only in their "togetherness" can the complex data have any
meaning in accordance with the fundamental and generic notions which
themselves are irrelevant in isolation. Thus coherence not only includes
in a self-consistent and harmonious whole all experience and thoughts
whether they be individual, social, theoretical, practical, ethical,
aesthetic, religious, or logical; but a method using coherence constructs
the total system by which the validity of each particular datum may be
4
tested. It will be the aim of this investigation to test each datum
2
Cf. Hocking, MGHF, 129 and 127. "It is this thought-over ex-
perience, experience already organized into idea which measures the power
of any mind to appreciate new experience, to find the world objects of
value. Value varies with idea-resource." (129) "Whatever energy is
spent in understanding experience, in attaching its meaning to the reality
idea, is so much recoverable energy for all other valuing .... It is
the creation of the very fabric of value. (127)
3
Cf. Sorley, MVIG for a relevant treatment of this Question.
4
See Brightman, ITP, 61. Also cf. Whitehead, PR, 5.
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by this criterion before ascribing to it any claim to truth or worth for
human personality. This raises a difficulty which must be dealt with here
at the outset of the study.
What validity should be ascribed to the claims of persons Y/hose
data are offered as truth based on an intuitive insight into the nature
of reality? The ansv/er is best revealed by stating the implication of
coherence for the relation of reason and intuition. In this study reason
will mean the process of selecting, organizing, testing, and systematically
interpreting the relevant evidence. The essential element of the many
usages of the term, intuition, is the reference to what is immediately
given in conscious experience. Although this reference often pertains
to perceived fact, the emphasis here in the use of the term will be upon
the principle of value to which the intuition refers in its function as a
way of knowing. So the claims of persons who assert the more immediate
and certain nature of their moral, aesthetic, or religious experience
must be heard. But when those persons test the adeouacy of their claims
as substitutes for mediate knowledge by the mere feeling of certainty or
fruitfulness in a belief, the line must be drawn at some point within
reason. Without discrediting the possible moral, aesthetic or religious
worth of these convictions, it should be noted that axiomatic feelings
are not ways of knowing. All beliefs are objects to be knovm about and
tested by reason for their consistency with other facts and values. That
convictions derived intuitively from a "passionate crisis in existence"
(which may be the essence of religious, moral, and aesthetic experience)
do influence greatly individual self-determination, is not cuestioned here.
It may be that the recognition of the congruence of such principles of
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value will tend to unify the individual experience from which the rational
princioles of interpretation must be derived. Our definition of exper-
ience assumed that self-experience itself is intuitively given in im-
mediacy. But in this study even self-experience will never be considered
as a substitute for self-knowledge. Unless there is some interaction and
cooperation between reason and intuition provided for in this inauiry, the
possibility of ideal value experience functioninr in the process of knowing
cannot be granted without substituting religious fervor, moral anguish,
aesthetic ecstacy or social enthusiasm for the hypothetical,mediate
knowledge to which are pinned our hopes of a "rationalistic sanity." For
if there is no criterion of coherence, one intuition has just as good a
claim to validity as any other; and with so irrational a method an adeouate
investigation of the data given for interpretation in this thesis would
not be possible. Although intuition must be considered as a oossible
source of insight, it will never be considered here as a criterion for
5
knowledge. Reason alone is sovereign in testing the evidence which will
5
In order thatthis necessary methodological distinction should
not minimize the rational element in certain types of feeling, this pas-
sage from Hocking, HNR, 104-105, is cited as consistent and acceptable to
the method of this thesis: "Desire or more generally, feeling, is not some-
thing disparate from thcught: feeling is a mass of idea at work within us.
It is a thorough fallacy to suppose that one can feel or care about any-
thing without knowledge, or that feeling and knowledge are inversely
proportional to one another. The theory of feeling has been seriously
distorted by confusing feeling with more or less incontinent or futile or
unstable types of motor discharge, "emotional temperaments," and the like.
Feeling is an experience of making up one's ”ind, rising to an occasion,
appreciating something to the extent of mobilizing the powers of action.
The proper contrast to feeling is not thought but callousness; and where-
ever I am insensitive to an interest or concern which ^iner members of the
race care about, I may know that the root of my deficiency is a lack of
intelligence or vision." (The reasons for not following Hockin^'s
monistic conclusions from this keen insight into self-experience will be
found in the following section.)
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be considered as relevant. But this is a regulative rather than a
constitutive function. The constitutive aspects of the process of being
will be investigated in the metaphysical pert of thir study.
C. The method of procedure.
It is inevitable as well as fortunate that there will always be
controversial elements ir philosophical discussions. However, such
divergence of interprets ticns as grows out of methodological obscurity
only adds confusion and detracts from the zest of a rational approach to
the really "persistent problems." To avoid such obscurity we cite the
working hypothesis by which this investigatior will proceed. It already
has been indicated that in this study any idea as a clue to the nature of
things beyond itself must be found in individual experience. This does
not in any way predetermine whether objective existence is physical or
mental in itself; but rather this assumes that reality for the exoerient
is given for interpretation tv rough the postulate that it is and the
working hypothesis what it is. Such epistemological dualism is central
to this investigation:
All that epistemological dualism asserts about the object is
that it is not identical with the idea of it; and all that
it asserts about the idea is tjjat it refers to, or describes,
or (simply) knows, the object.
This hypothesis is consistent with the assertion that in the immediate
personal consciousness of the concrete self-life the knowing process
can be interpreted monistically as regards the "datum self." This is
not pure knowledge by acquaintance, however. For genuine knowledge can
6
Brightman, ITP, 78. This discussion of dualism follows Chanter
III of ITP.
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be derived from this self-experience only throu ;h ideas referring to the
whole -elf and to external objects. This is, of course, dualistic.
The difference between self-experience, which is 1 ays present, and self-
knowledge, which is rarely achieved to its fuller possibilities, must be
re-cmphasized. For the possibility of avoiding the total skepticism which
ever threatens the duality of idea -nd object is found in the memory and
anticipation linkages given in self-experience by virtue of which present
immediacy ;rows out of the past and refers to the future.
Without predetermining any conclusions concernin the viev/s of
i we can seek his insight
which can he used here to the advantage
Thus the epistemological difficulty is only solvable by an
appeal to ontology .... There is a togetherness of the
component elements in individual experience. This 'together-
ness' has that special peculiar me- ring of 'togetherness in
experience. ' 1
In any "appeal to ontology" there are two alternatives. The dualism
which threatens the possibility of any knov.ledge may be reduced to the
monism of the Absolute Self: or this parallax between idea and object
may be mediated by a voluntaristic reference to ontological growth,
the meaning of experience as the ontological constituent of concrete exist-
ence can be described as the "self-enjoyment of being one among many, and
8
of being one arising out of the ccmoosition of the many," the concrete
growth of personality as the realization of ideal values is particularly
7
Vvhitehead, PR, 288.
8
Ibid., 220.
'. .
. . .
-
I
'
..
'
.
.
; :
.
—
8 .
relevant for consideration. This methodological perspective which
epistemological dualism affords is a hypothesis for procedure; hut the
component elements of the process of b^irg must be ascertained uoon the
basis of the evidence accounted for by Jung and Whitehead.
As the exposition proceeds it vd.ll be noted that there is no
explicit treatment of the clinical work of Jung or the strictly cosmo-
logical study of Whitehead, since these lie beyond the scope of this
incuiry. However, these cosmological notions as well as the psychiatric
methods of studying human nature ’"ill be implicitly involved in the
relation of human personality to its psychic and physical environment.
Value-experience consists of the realization of on end desired or
the satisfaction of a need in the life of the individual organism. In
this respect a human, person is organic to physical nature. Yet human
beings do seem to guide the realization of some values according to
individually selected ends which are products of the imagination. Accord-
ing to Krutch or Pareto this ideal of growth is an illusion. Behaviorists
would exclude the consideration of ideal values ince the consciousness
involved can not be admitted without expanding an initial method.
Instrumentalists contend that ideals should be controlling factors in
human conduct but that biological usefulness is t^e criterion. Experi-
ences which do not fall in these categories are ascribed to social
conditioning or genetically explained away. There are still other
thinkers who contend that there is a uniaueness in ideal value-exnerience,
which is causally influenced by but not determined by environment:!
conditions of individual experience. A sense of moral loyalty, a
yearning for beauty, an intellectual curiosity for no practical ends, and
.'
.
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a desire to worship with no reward or punishment involved, in short, an
apparently unique aspiration for and appreciation of fineness in thought
and conduct, at least, suggests the possibility of spiritual dignity in
human personality worthy of investigation. That an ideal is not found
fully actualized in any individual experience, is the mark of its very
nature: that there are conflicts between value aspirations, is as true
as that there are discrepancies in sense perceptions. But both reouire
the purposive control which is the function of re-'- son. Both merit
further investigation; but our scope limits this study to the former.
The rational organization of the letter is the task of the natural
sciences and experimental psychology. Since there seems to be no bio-
logical function which ideal value experiences perform, some other
criterion must be considered. For the possibility that a human being
might be able to organize this thought and conduct around an ideal of
what he feels he ought to be, is important enough to deserve a more
thorough test than that which a rat-cage affords.
The organic principle pervading the biological function of life
can be generically reproduced in the psychic process of mental life
according to the theory that there is an " interpenetration” of values.
This means that each value is determined by and instrumental to each other
value. If there is no single value by which the others might be tested,
then "the highest intrinsic value is the experience of a person whose
9
values are harmonious." For it is in man’s thoughts and aspirations, his
devotion to ideals, his illusions and tragic frustrations, that a
9
Brightmsn, ML, 155.
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meaningful aspect of the universe may possibly be disclosed. Such a
10
postulate for investigation could be called a "higher behaviorism,"
which avoids a stark naturalistic denial of a philosophy of objective
value
.
Behaviorism has furnished naturalistic inouiries a common denom-
inator for the study of human behavior. It is the aim of this essay to
seek an approach to the study of human conduct in terms of a common
denominator which is not only consistent with behaviorism, in so far as it
is true, but is also adeouate to the facts of ideal value experience,
the purposive elements of which behaviorism deems irrelevant. Perhaps
an ideal of personal growth is an illusion; but such a significant
judgment should come as a conclusion and not a premise of the investigation.
D. A preview of the accounts by Jung and Whitehead.
An epitome of the accounts by Jung and Whitehead discloses the
adequacy of their compatible psychological and philosophical methods for
furnishing the data and perspective for the problem of this thesis.
Jung was led to his view of the value of psychology for the
development and higher integration of normal personality by his studies
in mythological themes and in the problem of individuation. He insists
that the "unconscious" needs adequate analysis and interpretation. To
brand these data as "mysticism", as some of his critics have done, is no
rational refutation of the evidence which he interprets. In accordance
with his sound methodological perspective, Jung leaves the evaluation of
his organized observations to the interpretation of philosophy. In
10
Tsanoff, NOE, vii.
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synthesizing the work of Freud and Adler he recognizes the causal inter-
action of the sexual and egotistic (will-to-power) impulses with conscious-
ness. It is by virtue of the human psyche’s inherent creativity and self-
determining power for transforming these unconscious tendencies into
conscious purpose that human personality has the capacity for the achieve-
ment of ideals produced by the imagination and disciplined by thought.
Thus it is Jung's contention that individual introspection can become
constructive. For in this new enlightened attitude of man toward himself,
as well as toward others, lies the germ of a new possible attainment of
self-creation.
Process is the ultimate metaphysical princiole of Whitehead's
organic metaphysics. The function of purpose and emergence are generic
notions in this view. After Whitehead has formulated an inclusive
description of concrete growth in which he integrates all the data of
human experience as well as the other grades of occasions, he systema-
tically interprets the nature of ultimate reality according to those
metaphysical principles which are derived from his empirical description.
In describing human experience Whitehead suggests that the many data
which are components of the universe are felt as one by the subject
of the process of concrete growth. In this concrete growth of unity
out of complexity there is the self-enjoyment which is the determining
characteristic of the experience of self-identity. The interaction
between the subjective forms (emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions,
and "consciousness") and the given data is possible through the emergent
growth which integrates the matrix of feeling. Different forms of
jT ...
. i -
j- ' •
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mentality are factors in all existence; but the particular phases of the
total process of reality which we would call conscious discrimination or
knowledge are present only in the higher grades of the subject's purposive
realization of ideal values. The integrating force initiating and
sustaining this process is God as the principle of concretion and
persuasion. Therefore, the meaning of ideal values flows from the
interwoven nature of things.
In his work, A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior
,
Weiss has
presented a thorough descriptive account of the human organism. Is it
possible to formulate a normative account of human conduct? In dealing
with the problem this thesis will investigate the possibility of
purposively transforming mere desires into rational spiritual appetites
of a self-identical, self-conscious, and self-determining personality.
».
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CHAPTER II
THE FUNCTION OF IDEAL VALUE EXPERIENCE IN THE PROCESS OF KNOWING
A. The function of feeling in self-knowledge.
1. The active psyche and consciousness.
If all human thought and conduct can be entirely explained in
terms of the physiological responses to environment, no account of ideal
growth has an empirical basis. Although Jung recognizes the causal
influence of the body upon the psychic functioning of the human organism,
he denies the behavioristic account of mind in terms of matter:
We delude ourselves with the thought that we know much more
about matter than about a ’metaphysical* mind, and so we
overestimate physical causation and believe that it alone
affords a true explanation of life. But matter is just as
inscrutable as mind. As to the ultimate we can know nothing,
and only when we admit this do we return to a state of eaui-
librium.
In denying the adequacy of a behavioristic method Jung does not assume
that his own account is an ultimate interpretation of human mentality;
but he explicitly limits his investigation to the emoirical osychological
processes. If conscious mental functioning is to be accurately under-
stood, Jung further contends, one must recognize the limitations of and
seek to correct the ’’studies of consciousness which ignore the existence
1
Jung, MMS, 205.
2
Ibid., 176-177.
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of unconscious psychic life."
In his investigation of the human psyche Jung cites two funda-
mental points which must be kept in mind: (i) The fixed distinction between
the unconscious psyche and bodily traits is an artificial dichotomy which
is distorted by the intellectual understanding of this intricate inter-
mingling of bodily and psychic characteristics. (ii) "The psyche is still
a foreign, almost unexplored country of which we hav^ only indirect
knowledge; it is mediated by conscious functions that are subject to almost
4
endless possibilities of deception."
In the light of these basic assumptions it should be noted that
the psyche is not a passive substance, but rather it is an active pro-
5
cess for which "everything that acts is actual." Since the activity
heightens and maintains the feeling for the conscious aspect of person-
ality, it can be said to produce a purposive influence upon the conscious
mind in the letter’s activity of knowing. In the causal interaction
bet7/een the unconscious psyche and the conscious aspect of mental unity
there is a process of regulating the former and conditioning the latter:
Sensation establishes what is actually given, thinking enables
us to recognize its meaning, feeling tells us its value, and
finally intuition points to the possibilities of
ff
the whence
and whither that lie within the immediate facts.
"
3
Jung, MMS, 205.
4
Ibid., 85
5
Ibid., 85.
6
Ibid., 107.
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Jung compares this psychic orientation to the immediately experienced
world to the geographical orientation made possible by a compass.
Although he holds that these empirical functions of mentality are in-
dispensable for understanding the psychological aspect of the process of
knowing, "nothing prevents our shifting the cardinal points as many degrees
as we .like in one direction or the other, nor are e precluded from living
7
them different names."
In considering the whole mind as "an extended area of so-called
8
psychic phenomena which are partly conscious and partly unconscious,"
Jung accounts for the organized mental unity of temporal experience. It
is an experienced conscious awareness of some particular content, as
evolving out of the unconscious. This account of the mental function-
ing in immediate experience is based upon the following analysis of the
human psyche:
I may summarize by observing that we distinguish three mental
levels: (1) consciousness; (?) the personal unconscious: (3) the
collective unconscious. The personal unconscious consists of all
those contents that have become unconscious, either because, t^eir
intensity being lost, they were forgotten, or because consciousness
has withdrawn from them, i.e. so-called repr'-'^ion. Finally, this
layer contains those elements — partly sense perceptions, which
on .account of too little intensity have never reached conscious-
ness, an^ yet in some way have gained access into the psyche. The
collective unconscious, being an inheritance of the possibilities
of ideas, is not individual but generally human, generally animal^
even, and represents the real foundations of the individual soul.
7
Loc. cit.
8
CAP, 100. Cf .365.
9
Ibid., 110.
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In the physical organism the unconscious aspect of the psyche is "related
10
to environmental conditions in the most intimate manner." Furthermore,
the factor of purpose which unifies mental experience is derived from
11
unconscious elements.
In this wa/ one can form an idea of the nature of the psyche.
It consists of record-images of simole brain processes, and re-
productions of these images in an almost infinite series. These
images have the character of consciousness. The essence of con-
sciousness is a riddle which is beyond me. It is possible to say,
however, that anything psychic will take on the aspect of conscious-
ness if it comes into association with the ego. If this condition
does not exist it is unconscious. 1
It should not be supposed that this is a solipsistic assertion that
concrete existence is in anyway dependent upon an individual’s being
conscious of it; but rather the existence for that individual is an object
for knowledge only through this mental functioning. Furthermore, when
Jung asserts that the essence of consciousness in the serse of an ultimate
interpretation is beyond his understanding, he is not saying that there is
no empirical evidence for self-consciousness. On the contrary he affirms
the synthetic function of this dominating unity in the fact of immediate
experience:
It is my mind, rich in images, that gives the world color and
sound; and that real and most rational certainty which I call
experience is, in its most simple form, a supremely compli-
cated structure of mental images. So in a certain sense there
is nothing that is directly experienced except the mind itself.
Everything is mediated through the mind, translated, filtered,
allegorized, twisted, even falsified by it.
10
Ibid., 111.
11
See CAP, 61 and 85-84
12
CAP,
15
CAP,
81.
86 .
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The sequence of mental processes in the organization of emotional and
purposive compulsions by the "synthetic ego-consciousness" furnish the
data for psychological investigation. Since this involves more than
overt behavior, the problems have light thrown on them in many cases by
14
introspective methods.
Such problems as are involved in this detailed study of the active
psyche and consciousness are: (i) the interaction between the unconscious
and the conscious; (ii) symbolic expression and the individual libido;
and (iii) the organic functioning of idea and feeling in the givenness of
self-experience
.
2. The interaction between the unconscious and the conscious.
The evidence upon which Jung bases his postulate of the unconscious
can be investigated only indirectly in its effect upon consciousness or
in the dream imagery that is produced by the unconscious processes. As
the result of an intensive study of the latter, Jung has come to the
conclusion that though some dreams do embody suppressed desires and wishes,
the hypothesis that all dreams are such imaginary fulfilment, and that
none are anything more, is not justified by the evidence. His own
hypotheses is far more inclusive in its interpretation:
Dreams may give expression to ineluctable truths, to philosophical
pronouncements, illusions, wild fancies, memories, plans, anti-
cipations, irrational experiences, even telepathic visions, and
heaven knows what besides .... The dream is specifically the
utterance of the unconscious .... It is certain that conscious-
ness consists not only of wishes and fears, but of vastly more
than these, and it is highly probable that the unconscious psyche
14
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contains a wealth of contents and living forms eou^l to, or even
greater than consciousness, which is characterized by concentration,
limitation, and exclusion. '
It is a mark of Jung's scientific method that he recognizes the limi-
tation of his approach and is ever testing his method as well as his
conclusions in conscious experience. Freud's method has suffered from
his lack of such proper scientific humility and caution.
Jung's study of "dream-pictures," which furnish symbolic repre-
sentations of unconscious processes, has suggested to him the probability
of some kind of "centering process":
It is a process which brings into being a new center of eoui-
librium and it is as if the ego turned in an orbit around it.
What the aim of this process is remains at first obscure* We
can only remark its important effect upon the conscious per-
sonality. From the fact that the change heightens the feeling
for life and maintains the flow of life, wre must conclude that7
lfi
there is a peculiar purposefulness inherent in it.
Apart from the embodiment of this "peculiar purposefulness" in consciously
selected ideals, the conscious control of this unconscious "centering
process", which "heightens the feeling for life and maintains the flow
of life," could net be possible. When consciously selected ideals
elicit this "peculiar purposefulness" in either thought or conduct, it is
by virtue of the unconscious "centering process" with which they are
interacting in their creative as well as interpretive function. But
this conscious process will be investigated later. The emotional and
purposive factors in this unconscious "centering process" can not be
accounted for by mere rational conceptions of it. Its probable existence
15
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is postulated upon the function of some such process in the production of
symbol formation. In an integrated personality it is involved in the ideal
eliciting a conative disposition.
Although this interaction between the unconscious and the conscious
processes, such as feeling, intuition, end thinking conceptually is pos-
sible because there is a continuity of operation; still ther<^ is within
3
the total process a differentiation of function:
While consciousness is intensive and concentrated, it is transient
and directed upon the immediate present and the immediate field
of attention; moreover it has access only to material that rep-
resents one individual's experience ntretching over a few decades.
A wider range of 'memory* is artificially required and consists
mostly of printed paper. But matters stand very different ith
the unconscious. It is not concentrated and intensive hut shades
off into obscurity; it is highly extensive and can juxtapose the
most heterogenous elements in the most paradoxical way. More than
this, it contains, besides an indeterminable number of subliminal
perceptions an immense fund of accumulated inheritance-factors left
by one generation of men after another, whose mere existence marks
a step in the differentiation of species.
The intricate relation of the unconscious and conscious in this
process of interaction within the human psyche should not be taken for
an identification or the substitution of either for the other one. Each
process has its own organization for which it only can function, even
though this function itself is causally effected by the other process.
The unconscious should not be thought of as "a mere receptacle for contents
13
discarded by the conscious mind." Nor should conscious mentality be
considered as a mere shadowy projection of the psychic disposition shaped
17
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by the forces of heredity. For "consciousness, which is the ego's aware-
ness of its relatedness to what goes on within the psyche, has evolved both
19
in the individual and in the race, out of the unconscious. " This
functional continuity does not preclude the unioueness of the unity-ir-
complexity attained in self-consciousness, the minimum of which is "the
ego's awareness of its relatedness." For the central coint, here, is that
consciousness has evolved.
In this interaction the subjective conditions of objective thought
are involved. Jung guards against psychological determirism, on the one
hand, and against an ignoring of the psycholgoical factors as causal
influences upon conscious ideas, on the other.
We must always bear in mind that, despite the most beautiful
coincidences between the facts and our ideas, our explanatory
principles are none the less only points of view, that is,
phenomena of the psychological and aprioristic conditions under
which thinking takes place.
^
The "psychological conditions" arise from the inherited and accuired
psychic tendencies which actively influence the conscious thinking
process, even though the mind is not aware of the tendency as such. The
"aprioristic conditions" arise from the fact that though a psychological
method cannot render an interpretation of "truth" as such, the empirical
method can describe some of the processes of observation and association
by which possibilities of truth and possibilities of error arise in our
thinking. The objective truth which the mind seeks can never be explained
by a method which is limited to concomitant subjective processes; but to
19
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deny the possibility of reaching seme objective truth in seeking it, even
as an ideal postulate, is to go beyond the scope of psychological inouiry.
Thinking itself, as a means of transcending immediate experience,
necessitates some "working hypothesis" or "explanatory principles."
3. Symbolic expression and the individual libido.
Jung contends that the process of knowing is not limited to the
perceptive and logical relations of which the mind is aware in its
concentrated "field of attention." In the groundwork of th*3 human
psyche there are inherited psychic tendencies that produce primordial
images or mythological symbols which give rise to much of the thought
content of self-consciousness.
Science and these symbols are incommensurables. They are indis-
pensible conditions of the imagination; they are primary data
the materials whose expediency and warrant to exist science can
not deny offhand.
This symbol formation is the purposive factor in the imagination. With-
out imaginative symbols reason has no data from which ideals of thought or
conduct can be rationally derived. Intuitive insight is thus preserved
as a source of knowledge. The thinking by which the symbols are given
meaning will be considered later.
Jung grants that as a methodological procedure the natural
sciences must deal in deterministic terms of causality as an abstraction
from the total psychic process. But when the self seeks to know itself,
the data relevant to purposive feeling or a conative disposition can not
be ignored, for "even science cannot escape the psychological conditions
21
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of knowledge; and psychology must be particularly alive to these
22
conditions." In the purposive function of reason there is an uncon-
scious concomitant "ou mtum of libido" or psychic enery. The involved
interaction of efficient and final causality is indiscernible with a
method suitable only for investigating mechanical causality. Never-
theless, the effect of the individual libido upon conscious symbolic
expression must be investigated.
Psychic energy appears, when actual, in the specific, dynamic
phenomena of the mind such as instinct, wishing, willing, affect,
attention, power of work, etc. These in fact make up the psychic
forces. When potential, energy appears in specific acquisitions,
possibilities, aptitudes, attitudes, etc., which are its condi-
tions. £ 5
In mental development the attracting power of symbolic expression
represents this "corresponding auantum of libido." The creative and
interpretative power of ideals in human thought and conduct is an
empirical exemplification of this psychological principle that is central
for Jung.
Mental development cannot come through purpose and will alone.
There is need of the attracting power of the symbol, the value
auantum of which transcends the value of the cause. But the
formation of the symbol cannot take place until the mind has
dwelt long enough u^on the elementary facts; that is to say,
until the inner or the outer necessities of the life-process
have brought about a transformation of psychic energy. If man
were living altogether instinctively and automatically the
transformation could come about through biological laws. Some-
thing of this is still to be seen in the mental life of the
primitives, which is at t£| same time quite concretistic as
well as quite symbolical.'' *
22
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As long as the mind is regarded as an immutable substance or an ex-
clusively self-constitutive activity in its perceptive and logical
function, a psychological account of mental growth is impossible.
Such a narrow notion of mind as a magical agent approaching experience
from without is not only barren of interpretative value; but such an
abstraction from the total mental life misses the essential principle of
£5
mental growth itself. From Jung's point of view the experiential
mental unity functions as reason in the .purposive integration of
unconscious feeling reflected in the imagination. That scientific
analysis calls its symbolic ideals "working hypotheses" does not r<lter
the psychological principle involved. The volitional constitutive
growth of personality, which is symbolically expressed in ideals
necessary for self-knowledge, can not be more than mediately described
by a psychological method:
The psychologist, to be sure, may never abandon his claim
to investigate and establish relations in complicated psychic
events. To do so would be to deny psychology the right to
exist. Yet he can never ^ake good this claim in the fullest
sense, because the creative aspect of life which finds its
clearest expression in art baffles all attempts at rational
formulation. Any reaction to stimulus may be causally ex-
plained; but the creative act which is the absolute antithesis
of mere reaction, will forever elude the human, understanding.
It can only be described in its manifestations; it can be
obscurely sensed, but never wholly grasped. f
6
This fundamental principle of all self-experience needs the emphasis of
further illustration in other aspects than the aesthetic to which Jung
is referring here.
£5
See CAP, £6.
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Take, for ai. instance, the moral experience of obligation to act
unselfishly. No scientific account of glandular secretion or muscul r
reaction, no genetic analysis of unconscious motives or repressions,
can negate the given self-experience of this "creative aspect of life."
These scientific accounts must be considered in a proper evaluation
of the moral worth of the experience, but the sense of duty itself is
given for such a rational formulation. From this intuitive feeling
of self-experience rational principles of interpretation (symbolic ideals)
are derived. Without a process of reason there would be no basis for nor
matively evaluating the worth of this moral experience for thought and
conduct. Clarity of rational insight and the assumption of the objectiv-
ity of ideal growth depend upon this mental operation. No moral
experience of love occurs in self-experience without emotional and
physiological concomitants subject to psychological analysis: no rational
ideal for understanding the meaning or fruitful expression of that love
can be achieved without thoughtful consideration. However, neither the
analytic investigation by scientific method nor the synoptic evaluation
by ethical interpretation create the feeling of "oughtners" from which
both description and interpretation are derived and to which such
mediate explanation can only approximate. The love or feeling of
obligation is given in moral self-experience. Whether or not such an
: experience is mere illusion as far as objective value is coneemed, is
not a matter for psychological method to decide, but waits along with
other immediate experiences of sensations or mystical intuitions for
philosophical evaluation. But it is with the givenness of such self-
experiences that this psychological consideration is dealing here.

When an ideal is derived from "the most comprehensive experiences
of life," that ideal car be a symbolic expression vhich so affects an
individual libido as to elicit an "autonomous complex." Jung describes
the conditions of this psychic transformation as follows:
Only under the rulin' of 'an emotion can a concept, or whatever
the dominant idea may be, become an autonomous complex; without
it, the idea remains a concept subservient to the arbitrary
judgment of consciousness, a mere intellectual counter without
determining force. Ar idea as a mere intellects 1 concept has
no influence on life, because in this form it is little more
then an empty word. Conversely, however, if the idea achieves
the significance of an autonomous complex — then it effects
* ?7
the life of the personality through the emotions.
Consequently, certain ideals have had a transformln • influence in
individual self-experience of moral, aesthetic, religious, and cognitive
values because they have embodied the feeling qualities eliciting a
creative imagination that gives ourpose to personal Towth.
.
Christian doctrine of the Trinity exemplifies this symbol formation in
the realm of religious aspiration. But it is more to the point of this
particular section of the inquiry to realize that in the process of know-
V
ing the symbol formation which transforms end integrates the "autonomous
complex" in individual self-experience produces an ideal of unity,
consistency and coherence. The self-experience of intellectual
curiosity underlying all scientific and philosophical endeavor is the
crystallization of this particular "autonomous complex". It is a
cognitive attitude or a "psychological concept that designates an especial
grouping or ordering of the psychic contents; which grouping is oriented
27
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either by a goal or a so-called ruling principle."
In the light of this account, scientific and metaphysical first
principles are not only "working hypotheses" by which the immediate
self-experiences may be tested^ but because of their psycholo *ical
character these symbolic expressions are creative as well as inter-
pretative. So a faith in the objective validity of such systematic
interpretations elicits a creative transformation of the individual
libido in the process of knowing itself. The scientific nostulate of
causal continuity in an interconnected natural order and the meta-
physical postulate of an ultimate unity as the productive causality ex-
pressing a Divine purpose, illustrate the same psychologies 1 principle
and elicit the same psychic transformation. The determination of
objective validity is another matter for which psychological method is
29
not adequate.
4. Organic function of thinking and feeling in self-experience.
Jung assumes that in immediate self-experience there is an
interaction of unconscious feeling and conscious thinking by which the
former is made partially conscious and the latter has the capacity for
transforming the cunlity of the individual experience in which this
organic function operates. It should be noted, however, that thinking
is not said to create self-experience but rather to transform its
experience of ideal values. The ontological basis of the givenness of
28
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this experiential unity will be discussed later. Apart from this inclivid
50
ual immediacy the process of knowing is an utter mystery.
In addition to the sensations "that give the world color and sound
there are given in self-experience certain intuitions or sources of
spiritual wisdom such as faith, hope, love, or insirht. How thpn are
these indubitable data of sel^-exrverienoe to be accounts 1 for? Jur ’ s
answer is explicit:
These four highest achievements of human effort are so many
gifts of grace, which are neither to be taught or learned,
neither given nor taken, neither withheld nor reeerned, since
they come through exoerience which is something ~fiver
,
and
therefore beyond the reach of human caprice. Experience can-
not be made. They happen —yet fortunately their independence
of man’s activity is not absolute but relative. We can draw
closer to them — that much lies within our human reach. Th're
are ways which bring us nearer to living experiences, yet we
should beware of calling these ways "methods". The very word
has a deadening effect. The way to experience, moreover, is
anything but a clever trick; it is rather a venture which re-
quires us to commit ourselves with our whol^ being. ^
This is not a substitution of religious fervor, moral anguish, aesthetic
ecstacy or social enthusiasm, for the mediate functioning of the rational
processes. Rather this assumption is a recognition of those elements
of ideal aspirations which are given in self-experience. In the
function of reason rational ideals are derived from these creative
intuitions as hypotheses for their explanation. But when such self-
knowledge as results from this process of interpretation is achieved, it
must be distinguished from self-experience. Whereas the former is
abstract in the sense that science is abstract, self-experience itself is
50
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concrete and ceases to be the "actual creative aspect of life" in the
intellectual interpretation derived from it which neglects this intuitive
experiential source. "For nothing is more damaging and dangerous to
immediate experience than cognition:
But for the purpose of cognition ve must detach ourselves
from the creative process and regard it from without; only
then does it become a picture and express meanings. Then we
rot only may, but indeed we must speak of 'meaning. f And in
so doing what was before pure phenomenon, becomes something
that in association wath other phenomenon has meaning; it plays
a definite role, serves certain ends, brings about effects
fraught with meaning. And we can see all this we get the
feeling of having understood and e^lained something. Thus
is the need of science reco ;nized.
""
But the recognition of the essential place of mediate interpretation in
the operation of reason should not excessively narrow oersoective in
the process of knowing. This would discount the "subliminal perceptions
which are not at the disposal of the intellect, and which, therefore, are
33
missing in a purely intellectual picture of the world." A complete
comprehension of the world, and even much more of self-knowledge, reouires
an intuitive source of insight into the immediacy of self-experience for
the derivation of content for self-consciousness. Each of these
"subliminal perceptions" or intuitive insights must be tested for its
coherency with relation to other details of conscious experience. It is
a psychological condition of systematic thinking that this organic
function of idea and feeling should operate in the cognitive disposition.
For the attitude of conscious discrimins tion is basic to the rational
32
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process of observing, generalizing, criticizing and interpreting con-
sistently the most inclusive selection of relevant evidence,
human wishing, desiring, aspiring, and striving, which are embodied in
immediate self-experience, can rot be substituted for the mediate rational
principles of reflective self-knowledge. But the purposive function of
reason in self-consciousness can not elicit, direct, or regulate the
conative process of psychic growth in abstraction from these "subliminal
perceptions" or intuitive insights. Without rational integration and
transformation of unconscious psychic tendencies, disturbing complexes
will be produced in thought and conduct, whereas, in the rationally
organized life, ideals function as goals of emotional and purposive ful-
34
filment in the imagination, if not in actual realization.
It might be well at this point to recall that Jung has differen-
tiated between the functions of sensation (in which impressions of the
external world are given), thinking (by which meaning is recognized),
feeling (by which value is determined), and intuition (by which the
source and direction of the possibilities of concrete personal psychic
growth are given in flashes of insight) . Thus through intuition self-
experience is given to reason as a concrete unity; and through
interpretation the Weltanschauung or "distinctive way in which one views
the world" adds to the worth of life as well as giving it more intelli-
35
gibile meaning, since "retroactively it also changes us." It is at
this stage of the progression from a given experiential unity to a
34
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rational self-consciousness that the function of feeling in ideal value
experience becomes central to the process of self-knowledge.
It is evident, then, that I take feeling as a function in
itself and distinguish it from sensations and intuitions. Who-
ever confuses these last two functions with feeling in the narrower
sense, can obviously not acknowledge the rationality of feeling.
But if they are separated from feeling, it becomes cuite clear
that feeling values and feeling judgments — that is to say our
feelings — are not only reasonable, but are also as discrimi-
nating, logical and consistent as thinking.
Thus in the "venture which reouires us to commit ourselves with our whole
being", as the process of psychic growth, a scientific method can not in
abstraction from the intuitive insights of ideal values produce any
adeouate self-knowledge derived rationally from self-experience. There
is necessitated a closer examination of the value-intuitions given in
self-experience. For the conative development toward an ideal of
personality is at once the function of feeling and of reason. It is
when the objective validity of the function of feeling or ideal value
experience comes into question that a psychological method must recognize,
as does Jung’s, that there is involved "a very obvious limitation in the
57
application of the psychological view-point.
"
In view of Jung's insistence that a psychological method is only
adequate for ascertaining the empirical data, further investigation of the
ideal of personal growth requires a study of a compatible epistemological
interpretation
.
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B. Reason as the regulative principle of selecting data.
1. The concrete givenness of self-experience.
The key principle of the mental life is the subjective unity apart
39
from which "there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." In
the self-origination of high-grade human occasions "there is a togetherness
of the component elements in individual experience. This 'togetherness*
39
has that special peculiar meaning of 'togetherness in experience.'" It
is this unity-in-complexity that embodies those component factors of
concrete immediate experience, the elucidation of which is the sole
40
justification for any thought. What are these component factors that
are given in concrete self-experience?
The emotional conformation of puroose affords the continuity of
given self-experience. This self-con joined function of feeling is the
conformation from state to state in the orocess of becoming by which the
41
concrete self-life of each individual person is constituted. Each
!
subject so constituted is such in relation to everything else in the
universe; but especially important are those objects within the relative
perspective of the subject which provoke a special mode of activity within
the latter.
Such a mode of activity is termed a 'prehension.' Thus a pre-
hension involves three factors. There is the occasion of exper-
ience within which the prehension is a detail of activity; there
38
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is the datura whose relevance provokes the origination of
this prehension; this datum is the prehended object; there
is subjective form, which it the affective tone determining
the effectiveness of that prehension in that occasion of
experience. How the experience constitutes itself depends
on its complex of subjective forms. 4 '
Embodied in this complex of subjective forms are the physical and mental
poles that function in the self-unity as memory and anticipation linkages
by virtue of which the temporal conformation is possible.
To say that the brain is the organ of memory does not imply that
the brain does th° remembering or thinking or that the mind uses the brain
for these purposes It i
activities of thought and recollection in the same manner that inher-
ited psychic tendencies operating in the "unconscious” causally interact
with the mental process of conscious discrimination. In rejecting the
mechanistic account of cerebration, Whitehead contends that present
cerebration does not produce a memory of the image of the past. What
is thought to be such is rather an image in the present which is analogous
with the image produced in the past by past cerebration. In this
account the physical memory or efficient causation is analysed by the
associate mental occasion thus producing conscious memory. Because of
the irreversibility of time, "the image of the present is the outcome of
43
the gathering up of the true memory into the creativity of the present."
Just as the function of memory is to link the self-unity with the
past, out of which this concrete growth is constituted in its perpetual
42
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process of becoming, so volitional activity links the "utmost verge" of
present immediate self-experience with the possibilities of future concrete
growth. This volitional activity, which Whitehead calls anticipation,
is embodied in the "'subjective aim,' which controls the becoming of a
subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form
44
of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation." In the
case of the lower grade occasions such as an electron, for instance, an
anticipation is a blind physical fact. But the conceptual mentality of
45
self-conscious experience transforms it into a mental fact. For the
given subject of mental life is progressively defined by the ideal of
growth that is to be actualized in the future. The ideal itself is
46
derived from the creative intuitions of the experient.
In short, the component factors of. feeling, memory, thinking (not
found as necessary to all forms of experience)
,
and volitional antici-
pation are concretely experienced together as the subjective unity given
to the function of reason.
2 . The general form of conscious experience.
Consciousness can not be exactly defined but must be experienced
as "that quality which emerges into the objective content as the result
of the conjunction of fact and a supposition about that fact ....
It is the quality inherent in the contrast between Actuality and
44
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Ideality." Therefore, the development of conscious discrimination or
selective emphasis is a mode of attention relative to "the influx of
ideality into its contrast with reality, with tie purpose of reshaping the
latter into a finite, select appearance." In this relating activity
the many objects, apart from which consciousness could not be experienced.
are felt as unified in the persoective of the judging subject. Such
conscious discrimination is not the necessary base of all experience;
but arises in the higher phases of self-experience as an activity
regulating the emotional "enjoyment" of constitutive growth reflected in
49
1 the ideals of the imagination. This immediate self-consciousness
should not be considered as "a conception of a trim, tidy, finite
experience uniformly illuminated.
No notion could be further from the truth. In the first place,
the equating of experience with the clarity of knowledge is
against the evidence. In our own lives and at any moment, there
is a focus of attention, a few items in clarity of awareness, bu+
interconnected vaguely but yet insistently with other items in dim
apprehension, and this dimness shadding off imperceptibly into
undiscriminated experience .... The penetration of intuition
follows from the expectation of thought. This is the secret
of attention . . . ; Our variety of phase is infinite. ^
Though conscious discrimination is not necessary for the mere
self-enjoyment of immediate experience, it must be noted that "the ouality
of an act of experience is largely determined by the factor of thinking
47
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which it contains." Self-consciousness as the oroduct of reflection
becomes rational consciousness that is integrated according to the
52
conformation of purpose as "the very essence of life." But however
rationally organized self-consciousness may become, the idea in conscious-
ness is never identical with the object in the external world to which
the symbol elicited in individual experience refers. What, then, is the
relation of immediate self-experience to concrete existence?
5. Immediate experience and concrete existence.
Whitehead defines concrete existence in terms of the "self-
enjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the
55
composition of the many." In so far as this involves only an emotional
conformation of one state of existence to another, emotional awareness is
the mark of self-existence whether it pertains to a human or non-human
experience. But human thought about that external world of concrete
existence must begin with the analysis of the component elements arising
from the bodily functioning of each individual person. In self-cognition
"that part of the bodily event, in respect to which cognitive mentality
is associated, is for itself the unit psychological field:
Thus we know ourselves as a function of unification of a plurality
of things which are other than ourselves. Cognition discloses an
event as being an activity, organizing a real togetherness of alien
things. But this psychological field does not depend on its
cognition so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted
51
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from its self-cognition .... What is known is already a
prehension of aspects of the one real universe.
In the interwoven connectedness (prehensions) of all the particular
occasions of existence, human occasions *" re only rare instances. Never-
theless, a person, as a high-grade occasion of existence, "has truck with
the totality of things by reason of its sheer actuality"; even though
it "has attained its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis
55
limited to its own purposes." Thus human mentality is ontologically
continuous with the less specialized forms of concrete existence such
as electrons, for instance:
There is thus an analogy between the transference of energy
from particular occasion to particular occasion in physical
nature and the transference of affective tone, with its
emotional energy, from one occasion to another in human
personality. The object-to-subject structure of htman
experience is reproduced in physical nature by this vector
relation of particular to particular. ^6
Consequently, any limitation of the data of the universe by science to
physical energy, or by philosophy to mental energy, is an abstraction
"from the complex energy, emotional and purposeful, inherent in the
subjective form of the final synthesis in which each occasion completes
57
itself." (With this understanding of the nature of concrete existence
as independent of human thought about it, the main argument car. be
brought to a head.)
SMW, 216-217. Cf. ML, 40, PR, 6, and PR, 97.
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In the case of the immediate self-experience of a human person,
"the selective emphasis limited to its own purposes" involves conscious
discrimination (even if it is only a minimum of self-awareness) as "one
conjoined, self-consistent function whatever be the comolexity of that
58
function." In view of this function of conscious discrimination,
Whitehead contends that the objects for knowledge are oresent in every
act of experience; but there is no knowledge about those objects unless
there is a functioning of reasoning processes in the concrete immediate
59
experience of a particular person. By virtue of this rational self-
activity "experience receives a reorganization in the relative imoortance
60
of its components." Therefore, although concrete existence is no less
real because a person’s awareness of it and relative knowledge are depend-
ent upon the person’s mental functioning, the universe for that person
becomes unified through the selective self-construction of symbols derived
61
from his own immediate experience. With this assumption the question
of the relation of self-experience to self-knowledge becomes oarticulsrly
relevant.
4. Self-experience and self-knowledge.
It has already been indicated that though self-experience does
not in itself involve reflective thought, such a rational organization
58
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of individual consciousness by progressive self-knowledge makes a
62
difference of cuality in a self-conscious personality. The steps by
which such progressive self-knowledge is derived from self-experience
reouire investigation.
In his notion of symbolism Whitehead accounts for the knowing func-
tion by which the "temporal conformation from state to state" is
approximated by the human mind. For not only does the givenness of
experience depend upon this concrete "temporal conformation from state
to state"; but also does the universality of truth depend upon the
universality of relativity embodied in the notion of duration rather than
63
"pure succession." In accordance with this view of "supersession"
which is potentially internal to each occasion, Whitehead holds that
"there is no continuity of becoming, but there is a becoming of
64
continuity." To avoid the infinite regress involved in the notion of
a continuous process of becoming, Whitehead has concluded that time is
! epochal:
The occasion B which requires concretion so as to supersede
A embodies a definite quantum of time which I call the
epochal character of the concrescence. The epochal theory of
time is the foundation of the theory of atomic organisms, and
of the modern quantum-theory.^
62
See PR, 220, 236, 270, 516 and FOR, 64.
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Loc. cit. For this discussion the givenness of time is the
essential fact to be noted.
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In view of the essential part played by immedi' te experience in
a person’s knowledge of the external world as well as that of his own
personality, Whitehead rejects the epistemological assumption which seeks
to interpret experience by means of a strained attitude of attention. An
adequate account must be so organized that it does not 'determine the
given components of experience in abstraction from our orivate way of
66
subjective reaction, by reflection, conjecture, emotion, and purpose."
The process of knowing is an integral part of the process of being in
which human experience is an act of self-origination emerging from but yet
connected with Ihe whole of nature. "The living organ of experience is
67
the living body as a whole." The vague compulsions of emotion and
purpose, "which form the main stuff of experience, " are retained in "that
intimate sense of derivation from the body, which is the reason for our
68
instinctive identification of our bodies with ourselves."
The symbolic process of knowing is the exemplification of the fact
thc.t a unity of experience arises out of the confluences of many com-
ponents. Thinking as the essential function necessary for self-knowledge
effects a transformation of potentiality into actual unity upon the level
of human experience where the experient has the capability for symbol
formation as the basis for the function of reason.
But in the transformation from potentiality to actual fact
inhibitions, intensifications, direction of attention toward,
66
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direction of attention away from, emotional outcomes, purposes
and other elements of experience may arise. Such elements
are also true components of the act of experience; but they
are not necessarily determined by the primitive phases of
experience from which the final product arises. An act of
experience is what a complex organism comes to and in its
character of being one thing. Also its various parts, its
molecules, and its living cells, as they pass on to new
occasions of their existence, take a new color from the fact
that in their immediate past they have been contributory
elements to this dominant unity of experience, which in its
turn reacts upon them.^9
Thus self-knowledge as conscious discrimination of objects experienced
is an integral factor in the ontological interplay of subject with object.
Although this symbolic self-knowledge itself is mediate in the form of
rational principles, it is derived from and substantiated by "direct
intuitive observation" of the primal constitutive process of immediate
70
self-experience
.
Before the dualistic character of reflective knowledge can be
investigated in Whitehead's account, the initial pre-reflective stage of
the knowing process, which is monistic in the sense that self-experience
is a unity, must be considered.
Whitehead designates this initial process of self-knov ledge or
knowledge of the external world as "symbolic reference" in the modes
of "presentational immedicay" and "causal efficacy." In holding the
relativistic position that "individual perceptivity is the ultimate
69
SME, 86-87.
70
Cf. AI, 228.

physical fact," he bases the essential contingency of individual immediate
experience on these ontological principles: (i) What for the sub-human
level of existence are blind prehensions, for humsn occasions are instances
of self-experience in the mode of presentational immediacy. (ii) This
ohysica.1 imagination or sense perception is made conscious relative to
71
mental functioning. • In this intuitive immediacy the self most closely
conforms to the givenness of "temporal supersession"unon which the
72
universality of truth depends.
Through the mode of "causal efficacy" the self becomes aware of a
connection in the order of external things and a sense of continuity
between the past, his present bodily condition, and his present immediate
experience. "Causal efficacy is the hand of the settled past in the
73
formation of the present." • The vagueness of this mode interacts with
the mode of "presentational immediacy" in the presented locus or
"specious present" of the self-identical and individual perspective. In
the self-activity involved in this interaction "this symbolic reference is
the active synthetic element contributed by the nature of the percip-
74
ient." Within the perspective by which each experient "enjoys" an
apprehension of the world given for such awareness emotional and
purposive compulsions are felt as constituting self-experience.
71
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Since consciousness is an emphasis upon the selection of objects,
perception is consciousness analyzed in respect to those objects
selected for this emohasis. Consciousness is the acme of emphasis.
It is evident that this definition of perception is wider than
the narrow definition based upon sense-perception, sense, and the
bodily sense-organs.^
This account of non-sensuous perception is based upon a function of the
human mind for which the view of mere sense-perception does not provide
adequate recognition. The external world is given for knowing as are
the emotional and purposive compulsions of self-experience; but "no
material for the interpretation of sensa is provided by the sensa them-
selves, as they stand starkly, barely present, and immediate. We do
77
interpret them." In self-knowledge this non-sensuous perception
functions in our knowledge of our own immediate past of a fraction of a
second ago:
It is gone, and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self,
the foundation of our present existence. Yet the present
occasion while claiming self-identity, while sharing the very
nature of the bygone occasion in all its activities, neverthe-
less is engaged in modifying it, ir adjusting it to other
influences, in completing it with other values, in deflecting
it to other purposes. The present moment is constituted by
the influx of the other into that self-identity which is the
continued life of the immedi te past within the immediacy of
the present.
According to the "reformed subjectivist principle" the notion that
the object completely determines the process of knowing, in which the
76
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mind passively contributes nothing, is rejected. Though the physical
inheritance of percepta is given rrd can not be made or modified in its
character as a datum by the mind, "the final synthesis, with its oroductior
of appearance, is reserved for the occasions belonging to the oersonal
79
soul." In the interpretative synthesis the mind becomes the regulative
principle of selection and unity. This is the subtle rational process
originating in the creative activity of memory and perception and
culminating in the production of "appearance" or the mediate re-construc-
tion of immediate intuitions by which external existence and the future
possibilities of personal growth are made the objects to which ideas in
80
the mind refer. For "in every act of experience there ^re objects for
knowledge; but, apart from the inclusion of intellectual functioning in
81
that act of experience, there is no knowledge." Therefore, the
function of reason on the level of rational consciousness is both creative
and selective in the production of reflective principles that both elicit
and interpret ideals derived from the imagination.
Although it might be said that self-knowledge of the past is in
the modes of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, and although
the present might be said to be intuited in the mode of presentational
immediacy, the future possibilities which are central to self-knowledge
can be consciously recognized only by the speculative process of ration-
79
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ally formulatirg ideals. Intuition which even at best is not without
some interpretation, becomes symbolic interpretation. "Symbolism is
essential for the higher grades of life; and the errors of symbolism
83
can never be wholly avoided." Epistemological monism is thus seen
to account inadecuately for the future possibilities of personal growth.
It also lacks any principle for explaining the fact of error. Only a
dualistic epistemology can adequately account for such error as is
involved in the conscious recognition by the mind of the objects (real
or ideal) to which the ideas refer. Though these "monistic" pre-
speculative modes condition and interact with the reflective stages, the
immediacy of the former does not render the speculative interpretations
of the latter any less mediate.
Thus the result of symbolic reference is what the actual
world is for us, as that datum in our experience productive
of feelings, emotions, satisfactions, actions, and finally
as the topic for conscious recognition when our mentality
intervenes with its conceptual analysis.
^
In this analysis of the concrete givenness self-experience is seen to be
the basis of self-knowledge; but self-knowledge in interpreting this
given "topic for conscious recognition" is essentially dualistic in
character. With this assumption comes the responsibility of (i) pointing
out the conditions of a dualistic interpretation; and (ii) meeting the
polemic of skepticism directed against every form of epistemological
dualism. (in this task the reasoning process by which the process of
83
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reason is investigated in this thesis must itself be restated so as to
account for the change from a more analytic to a more synthetic method.)
C. Reason as the speculative principle of coherent interpretation.
1. The conditions of a dualistic method.
The perspective of and, to a large extent, the conclusions of any
speculative approach are determined by the method emoloyed. Since the
possibility of error seems to be adecuately accounted for by a dualistic
method only, the monistic theory has been rejected as inapplicable to
speculative endeavor. But the conditions, with special reference to
the criterion of truth, upon which a dualistic perspective might be
formulated still reauire investigation. For "ohilosoohical discussion
85
in the absence of a theory has no criterion of the validity of evidence.”
In his definition of speculative philosophy Whitehead indicates
the general nature of the theory or "working hypothesis” as well as the
criterion he employs for testing the data:
Speculative Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent,
logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which
every element of our experience car be interpreted. By this
notion of ’interpretation’ I mean that everything of which we
are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall
have the character of o o- rtieular instance of the general scheme.
If speculation is to be coherent, the fundamental ideas of a rational
scheme must be so formulated that they necessarily presuppose each other
in an inclusive and harmonious account. For an idea to be admitted or
retained in this rational formulation, it must have this character.
85
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namely, coherence with the rest of the scheme. Such notions must also
be logical and self-consistent. In seeking to attain such a synoptic
vision "the recuirement of coherence is the great preservative of
rationalistic sanity." For "incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection
87
of first principles." In seeking tentatively to formulate as inclusive
generic notions as possible and in exploring as many possible adjustments
of ideas, it must not be forgotten that the intrinsic reasonableness of
such rational principles is their adeouacy and applicability in inter-
preting the given data of immediate experience for the elucidation of which
88
the speculative effort " res made.
Since the starting point for thought is the analytic observation
of the component elements in immediate experience, weakness of insight and
inadequacies of language prevent any final formulation. However, there
i
is no first principle which is in itself unknowable by rational insight.
The progressive approximation cf a coherent interpretation to the actual
structure of reality is possible through an "asymptotic approach to a
scheme of principles, only definable in terms of the ideal which they
89
should satisfy." Such a "working hypothesis" as might be used to
interpret the topics of human thought or conduct become measuring rods
for the rationality of human value experience. It is the task of
speculative philosophy to formulate those ideals of interpretation which
integrate such thought and conduct. For "the power of ~oing for the
87.
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penetrating idea, even if it has not yet been worked into any methodology,
90
is what constitutes the progressive force of Reason."
As an ideal value experience intellectual curiosity is a product
of wonder which seems to be limited to the reflective self-consciousness
of human beings. Although science and philoso hy have replaced magic
and superstition "the wonder remains. There has been added, however,
some grasp of the immensity of things, some purification of the emotions
91
by the understanding." According to the division of labor by which
reason seeks to realize its ideal, the scientific emphasis is uoon the
observation of particular occurences, and upon inductive generalizations
in laws of nature which indicate the manifestation of the universal
process in particular functions. On the other hand, the emphasis of
philosophy is upon the universality of particular observations as they
are interpreted in the coherent systematization of generic notions.
Multiplicity of fact is. integrated by the rational unification of meaning.
The task of reason is to fathom the deeper deoths of the many-
sidedness of things. We must not expect simple answers to
far-reaching ouestions. However far our gaze pergtrates, there
are always heights beyond which block our vision.
The aesthetic enjoyment, which reflective thought furnishes a
rational person seeking to realize the value of intellectual curiosity
or technological utility, should not blind one to the fact that mixed
with apparent certainties, which themselves can never be more than
90
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working hypotheses, is much ignorance for which only probability can be
substituted. Skepticism has to be considered as very immanent when "the
basis of all probability and induction is the fact of analogy between
93
an environment presupposed and an environment directly experienced."
No exact correspondence between fact and idea is possible in any
speculative interpretation that aims at the full comprehensiveness by
which man's deepest intuitions are .cultivated. The trustworthiness of
reason is auesticned on the basis of the parallax between the conscious
idea and the postulated object to which the mental activity refers and
by which it is provoked. Is the speculative venture (as well as the
inductions of scientific method) an inherently irrational assumotion?
2. Skepticism and the appeal to ontology.
In holding to the assumption that "the final court of appeal is
94
intrinsic reasonableness," Whitehead has freed himself from s static
conception of truth; but he has also assumed the responsibility of showing
that "the very possibility of knowledge should not be an accident of God's
95
goodness; it should depend on the interwoven natures of things."
Since concrete existence has been postulated as a necessary objective world
to which the ideas of immediate experience might refer in their bid for
rationality, even the external world is a "working hypothesis" no less
than the existence of other minds and an ideal of personal growth to
93
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which a mere "unioue experiential togetherness" in immediate experience
96
refers. It is the hope of rationalism that these "working hypotheses"
systematically organized into a general theory will adequately and
coherently interpret the intuitive perceptions, emotions, and purposive
ccraoulsions of immediate self-experience. "This hope is not a meta-
physical premise. It is the haith which forms the motive for the oursuit
97
of all sciences alike, including metaphysics." Certainty is forever
imoossible in this "asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only
98
definable in terms of the ideal Coherence] which they should satisfy."
But reasonable probability is thus seen to be as affirmable as the
skepticism based on "unknovrability" of first principles.
The preservation of such faith must depend on am ultimate moral
intuition into the nature of intellectual action — that it should
embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the point
where metaphysics — and indeed every science — gains assurance
from religion and passes over into religion. But in itself the
faith does not embody a premise from which the theory starts; it
is an ideal which is seeking satisfaction. In so far as weQQbelieve that doctrine, we are rationalists.
But what does Whitehead substitute for the Absolute Self by which
the monistic idealist avoids the skepticism bred by the uncertainty of
i this dualistic method? Instead, Whitehead makes an "appeal to ontology,"
since "all difficulties as to first principles ar’ only camouflaged
96
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100
metaphysical difficulties." But is not the Absolutist's solution an
"appeal to ontology" also? It is so : but Whitehead's alternative is of
something
a different kind. It is to more like finite volitional activity than to
A
divine mediation that he appeals in his reference to the process of being
for the solution of this fundamental epistemological difficulty.
By referring to the structure of the immediate experience of a
person in whose sensations^ emotions, compulsions of purpose, in short, by
whose "self-enjoyment" the actual world is prehended as a given datum —
here in the structure of the actual entity "the problems of efficient
101
causation and knowledge receive a common explanation." The function of
"direct intuitive observation," in which the external world is described
by a scientific method, is a subject not included in the scope of this
study. Yet the explanation of efficient causation in the concrete growth
of personality, which is relevant to the explanation of how skepticism
can be avoided in sd-f-knowledge
,
is central to this inquiry.
In the texture of the high-grade subject of experience which a
human person has become, the concrete growth of personality is constituted
by the realization of values, some empirical, some ideal. The objective
reference of the "unicue experiential togetherness" of immediate emotional
awareness is not limited to the postulated external world; but this
immediate self-experience also refers to the postulated ideal of a total
personality. Toward this ideal of personal growth the subjective aim of
100
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purposive self-creation is directed. In the unioue self-experience
unified by memory and anticipation purposive ideals of thought are trans-
formed into purposive ideals of value experience. This volitional activity
103
elicits creative growth. Whereas mere discursive abstractions cannot
escape the skeptical charges brought against epistemological dualism, there
is a truth about ultimate reality accessible through the coherent realiza-
104
tion of ideal values. That the emotional conformation of such an
anticipatory act of experience in the process of becoming is central to
the Droblem of the universality of truth, has been asserted unequivocally
by Whitehead:
Universality of truth arises from the universality of relativity
whereby every particular actual thing lays upon the universe the
obligation of conforming to it. Thus in the analysis of particu-
lar fact universal truths are discoverable, those truths ex-
pressing this obligation.
The truth which the analysis of self-experience expresses as an obligation
to which self-knowledge must conform, if it is to escape the skeptical
relativism of mere abstract discursive knowledge, is the purposive
control of all ideal value experience. This is the function of reason
by which reality is disclosed in the art of life.
This function is to constitute, emphasize, and criticize
the final causes and strength of aims directed towards
them .... It is well to be quite clear on the point
102
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that Reason is inexplicable if purpose be ineffective.
3. Transition from the process of knowing to the process of being.
In the light of the investigation thus far, the key principle in
the process of knowing has been the purposive function of reason. This
is the ideal value experience of rational activity in the selective
analysis and interpretative synthesis of the evidence given in immediate
self-experience. Concrete existence in itself is independent of the
conceptions of it derivatively embodied in self-consciousness. But the
concrete existence of the external world and the past existence of one’s
own self-identity is dependent upon the selective and regulative re-
construction of sense and value intuitions. Within this synthetic
consciousness concrete existence has meaning for persons capable of such
rational activity. The self-conscious experience, in which the data to be
known about are given, maintains its urity-in-comolexity by virtue of the
function of memory and ideal anticipation. Through this experiential
unity the present inheritance of the past is purposively directed tovrard
actualization in the concrete growth of personal unity in the future.
The mediate ideas derived from the intuitive experience of sensation,
emotion, and compulsions of purposiveness, are necessary abstractions
from concrete psychic growth.
The mediate knowledge of the external world is thus based upon
a postulate of its concrete existence. It is given in the bodily
functionings from which the implications of its reality are derived.
Through scientific analysis and cosmological notions of the relation of
106
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the ’’stubborn facts" to each other, the workiqg hypothesis that there is
such an objective reality is tested for its rational validity.
The mediate knowledge of the self is based upon a postulate of a
total self toward which the "unioue experiential unity" or immediate self-
consciousness is growing. The past inheritance, from which self-knowledge
is partially derived, is known by the same method as that by which the
data suggesting the external wrorld are analysed. But the future possi-
bilities of self-creation are given in the emotions, aspirations, and
I
purposive compulsions intuitively experienced and ideally embodied in the
disciplined imagination. The derivation of such rational principles
recuires a synoptic method by which an- ideal of personal growth is tested
for its consistency with other intuitions and for its inclusiveness of the
total relevant experience. Though perfect clarity is highly desired, it
is not always possible; but the rational congruence of imagination
distinguishes ideal anticipation from the vagueness and neurotic intro-
version of mere phantasy.
However coherent may be the analytical knowledge of the concrete
existence of the external world or the self’s inheritance from its past
or present environment, and however coherent may be the synoptic self-
knov/ledge of the ideal possibilities of future self-creation, regardless
of the maximum of systematic clarity in conscious discrimination, never-
theless, such knowledge is only mediate. As such, these rational
principles of interpretation are based upon postulates that have no
inherent guarantee that there is a corresponding reality. A relativism
]
with its skeptical consequence for knowledge threatens the validity of all
interpretation. Skepticism as a theoretical possibility is inescapable
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unless the existence of error in the process of knowing is to be irration-
ally disregarded altogether. That would be the same as intellecual
suicide. Skepticism as a rational certainty is so evidently a self-
contradiction when the very assertion of this truth gives reason at least
enough validity to deny that it has any at all. How then car there be
a mediation of this parallelism so that these postulated working hypotheses
may be further tested?
The rational probability of the actual correspondence between
the environment of the external world and the impression of that environ-
ment embodied in the sensations is an important issue. But it is a
matter which falls without the scope of this thesis, except in so far as
such cosmological data are directly relevant to that aspect of self-
experience from which self-knowledge is derived.
In the case of self-knowledge itself, this skeptical relativism
must be dealt writh at once, if this investigation is to proceed. The
objective validity of an ideal for a total personality reouires an account
of the concrete growth of personal unity. This involves an analysis of
the component elements in present self-experience as it grows out of the
past. It necessitates a synoptic interpretation of the possibilities of
the present self-consciousness as it emerges into the realization of the
future. In the rational consciousness necessary for self-knowledge
(though not for self-experience) there is a synthetic unity of sense
with value intuition, the past with the present, and the actual compulsions
of emotional and purposive aspirations. In the present i:nmediate
experience the possibility of ideal value depends on anticipation for the
future. This volitional activity is not the same as self-knowledge; but
'.
it is the concrete exoerience from which the insights of self-knowledge (in
regard to future possibilities) must be rationally derived end coherently
tested for worth and validity. But the distinction between ideal value
experience in the concrete self-life and abstract self-knowledge, does not
imply that the latter is of no difference to the former. On the contrary,
the cuality of self-conscious ide- 1 value realization is dependent uDor
self-knowledge, not only as one integral part of itself, but also as the
function by which the realization of ideal v- lues is purposively controlled.
Although an ideal is derived from an intuitive experience genetically
prior to self-consciousness, such an ideal becomes a rational principle for
thought end conduct, only, when it has been consciously recognized as such.
In that recognition the future is in the making.
Therefore, this epistemological problem of the skepticism threaten-
ing the parallelism of idea and object necessitates an investigation of
the purposive activity of self-experience. This investigation must
transfer its focus from the process of knowing to the process of being.
For the rational probability of self-knowledge car net be affirmed or denied
until the working hypothesis of ideal value realization in a total person-
ality has been considered. This involves a genetic analysis of emotional
and purposive compulsions (or psychic tendencies) as well as a synthetic
interpretation of the concrete growth of personal unity.
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CHAPTEE III
THE FUNCTION OF IDEAL VALUE EXPERIENCE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING
A. Jung's analytical interpretation of the process of self-creation.
1. The energic conception of psychical events.
In his conception of psychical events Jung rejects the mechanistic
view with its purely causal notion of events as uniformly shiftir^ spatial
1
relations between immutable substances. He advances the "energic" view
which is essentially teleological in character. To avoid ambiguity he
uses the term "final" in place of "teleological". However, when the human
level of existence is concerned, as it is in this thesis, the meanings of the
terms are interchangeable. Although this does not deny that the causal
account has some value as a limited explanation, Jung joins with modern
physics in recognizing its inadeouacy and one-sidedness as a complete
interpretation.
Therefore, not only the facts of a cosmological account, but also
the meaning of symbolic ideals embodying emotional and purposive psychic
1
This discussion is based on Jung's description of psychic energy
which is a notion comparable to physical energy in physics. "Psychic energy
appears, wrhen actual, in the specific, dynamic phenomena of the mind such as
in instinct, washing, willing, affect, attention, power of work, etc . .
These in fact make up the psychic forces. When potential, energy appears
in specific acquisitions, possibilities, aptitudes, attitudes, etc., which
are its conditions." CAP, 15. Cf. CAP, 1-5; 17; and 25-56.
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tendencies, must ultimately be interpreted from the energic point of view.
a. The dynamic theory of life.
Jung’s energic notion is expressed more concretely in his con-
ception of the psychic constitution of personal character as the individual
form of the human being. In self-experience the potential energy embodied
in specific possibilities and attitudes toward them becomes actual psychic
energy in the volitional activity of the whole self's endeavor. The
complex functioning of various psychic tendencies can be integrated for
purposes of psychological interpretation around two fundamental attitudes
of the self, that of introversion and that of extroversion. Before dis-
cussing this notion another central principle of the dynamic theory of life
should be cited.
In considering complexes as constitutive psychic activity which
has crystallized at a focal point in psychic growth, Jung comes to these
conclusions: (i) Feeling as a normal function is distinguished from the
self-experience of sensation and intuition. (It will be recalled that by
"feeling" Jung refers to the function of evaluation which is experienced
3
in psychic orientation along with sensation, thinking, and intuition.)
4
(ii) The concrete process of psychic growth is a function of feeling.
b. Psychological types.
The vital function of personal attitudes in the psychic process
of self-creation is emphasized in Jung's description of psychological types.
2
See CAP, 15. Cf. MS, 261.
5
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4
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The total result of my work in this field up to the present
is the presentation of two general types covering attitudes
which I call extroversion and introversion. Besides these I
have worked out a four-fold classification corresponding to
the functions of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition."
Therefore, personal attitudes of introversion or extroversion or a b-: lanced
correlation of the two can be purposively regulat-d ir one’s thought and
6
conduct by ideals which elicit "the predominant psychic content," and guide
its realization as value experience in the process of self-creation which
is emotionally appealing and intellectually satisfying. This is illustrated
in the respective ideals which integrate the attitudes and consecu~ntly the
character of the aesthete, whose appreciation of beauty alone leads him to
seek escape in introversion, the zealot, whose fanatical devotion to one
cause has calloused his appreciation of other values, so that his lack of
inner sufficiency drives him to extroversion, or the individual who so
purposively controls his emotional ard intellectual attitudes that he
seeks a harmoniously integrated ideal value experience. The character of
the latter is determined by the manner in which he organizes his thought
and conduct so as to satisfy his introverted spiritual appetites for
beauty, truth and holiness along with an extroverted expression of socia-
bility and an enlightened good will. The de ree to which su'h mental
ijactivities are organized in a consistent and progressive realization hy
inner and outer adjustment, to that degree psychological types of "normal"
persons will vary. It is this view of human nature that is central to
5
Ibid., 107.
6
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the possibilities of self-creation as suggested by Jung, which will be
7
considered later in this account.
In the genetic theory of the libido which is basic to this view
of psychological types Jung fully takes into account the etiological
factors of the sexual impulse (Freud) and the masculine protest in the
will-to-power (Adler). But in thinking of all instincts or unconscious
tendencies as specific forms of psychic energy he investigates the
possibility of a relative psychic unity or libido from which the multiplic-
ity of instinctive tendencies and unconscious impulses emerge:
Thus we can easily reconcile Freud with Adler when we consider
the psyche not as a rigid and unalterable system, but as an ex-
tremely moveable or fluid activity, changing kaleidoscopically
in accordance with the predominant psychic content.^
Before following Jung's genetic analysis of these emotional and purposive
compulsions given in immediate self.-experience, it might be well to recall
the notion of the "centering process" in the function of which the individ-
ual libido can be transformed. The relation of this psychic process to the
ideal value experience of religious faith and intellectual curiosity has
9
been discussed in a previous section. The exemplification of this
psychological principle in the ideal value experience of moral obligation
will serve to recall the implications of this "centering process" for an
"autonomous complex". Then the genetic analysis of the component osychic
tendencies of emotion and purpose will be seen in their concrete perspective
7
See PU, v.
8
CAP, 345.
9
See page 25 of this thesis.
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The moral experience of obligation involves the transformation
of the libido according to the ideal of conduct in the light of which the
"oughtness" was felt. Such moral experience in self-consciousness has
a "peculiar puroosefulness inherent in it" so that the moral asoiration
10
involved "heightens the feeling for life, and maintains the flow of life."
For the notion of obligation which is central to ethical theory is not
an arbitrary opinion or discovery of individual thinkers; but the conscious-
ness itself as well as the many practices and convictions involved in moral
experience "owe their origin far more to the existence of strong, uncon sciou
11
powers which we cannot neglect without disturbing the psychic balance."
This purposive transformation of the libido in the recognition of moral
ideals is an essential conditioning factor in the consciousness of moral
obligation. The rational derivation of a moral ideal from intuitive
aspiration and the coherent formulation of this emotional and purposive
appetite into an ethical principle, such as that of an enlightened good
will, is a utilization of psychic energy. This transformation of the
individual libido "into higher purposes and directions suitable for the
12
individual at his present status is called sublimation .
"
10
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£. The transformation of the libido,
a. Sublimation of the dominating unconscious tendencies.
The dominating unconscious tendencies that underlie the emotional
intuitions of self-experience are those of the will-to-power and the
sexuality expressed in its various channels. The genetic analysis of
these motives is revealed in the process of their sublimation.
In the adaptation of the individual to his inner world the subli-
mation of the selfish will-to-power into ambition for the realization of
moral autonomy is a fundamental aspect of- the transformation of the
individual libido. Jung subscribes to Adler's view that there is not
only a struggle of the individual ego for mastery under the masculine
protest; but the psychological condition and the arrangement of the bodily
organs are partial determinants in the individual's destiny. On the
psychological level, however, there is an inherent tendency to growth that
is not determined by the physiological process. The desire to actualize
this psychic potentiality is more fundamental than the secondary drives of
human behavior which are often said to be primary: the preservation of self,
the propagation of self, and the relation to group behavior. This power
motive is present just as much in the person whose desire is to make others
good as it is in the desire of the warrior whose motive is dominantly to
conouer by physical force. (The evaluation of the motives is another
matter.) Besides such manifestations as these th^re is a"will-to-power"
which is even less interested in power in itself. This is the ambition
to achieve a higher psychic organization such as that which many of the
great seers of the race h&ve advised men to seek as the "kingdom within."
. ; . : _ . -
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The striving to achieve such an ideal value realization is a sublimation
of this will-to-power which is integrated in Jung’s notion of the
"prospective aim." Since this striving is but one factor, the second
should be considered before discussing the fund- rn : t? 1 principle which
integrates and goes beyond both of them.
The second focal point of libidinous energy, the transformation of
which is a factor in self-creatior
,
is the sexual impulse. That the
egoistic or will-to-power is not the only component element in the emotional
basis of self-experience is emphasized by Jung:
It is a remarkable fact that a life lived entirely from the
ego usually affects not only the oerson himself, but observers
also as being dull. The fullness of life reouires more than
just an ego; it demands spirit, that is an independent, over-
ruling complex, which is apparently alone capable of calling
into living expression all those mental possibilities that the
ego-consciousness can not reach. -1
An understanding of how this sexual impulse might be utilized for higher
purposes than its uncontrolled expression by removing repressions and
lifting of infantile tendencies, reouires further consideration.
In this utilization of psychic energy for ideal purposes is the
psychological basis for the notion of altruism. But why should one con-
sider the underlying motives involved in altruism? Why not just be
altruistic? It is certainly true that the richest moral experiences are
those which involve a type of unselfish action so that an evaluation of
personal motive or selfish value is at a minimum. Nevertheless, the
purpose of this study is to inauire into the ontological status of human
motives. Furthermore, Jung points out that "an inwardly sound and
15
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self-confident person will be more adequate to his social tasks than one
14
who is not on good terms with his unconscious." Self-knowledge seems
basic to such self-confidence.
Although Freud did not interpret sexuality in the extreme sense
in which he has been said to by many of his critics his interpretation is
too narrow to be adequate to all the aspects of self-experience. In
correcting this inadequacy Jung has not minimized the importance of Freud’s
work in so far as it is adequate and inclusive. The influence of the
sexual impulse upon many unconscious experiences is unquestionable,
according to Jung, even when it is not so apparently the un conscious factor
causally interacting with conscious motives. Jung has estimated the
importance of the part played by sexuality in the emotional cuality of
self-experience in the following:
Sexuality is not merely instinctiveness, but am indisputable
•creative power that is not only the cause of our individual lives,
but an increasingly serious factor in our psychic life. Today
we know all to well the grave disorders that sex disorders can
bring in their train. We might call sexuality the spokesman of
the instincts; therefore the spiritual standpoint sees it as its
chief antagonist, not because sexual indulgence is itself any more
immoral than excessive eating or drinking, avarice, tyranny and
other extravagances, but because the spirit senses in sexuality
a peer, a counterpart related to itself. For just as the spirit
would subordinate sexuality, like every other instinct to its
form, so sexuality in its turn has ar ancient claim upon the
spirit, which once —in begetting, in pregnancy, in birth and
childhood — it contained within itself ; moreover, the spirit
^
c
can never dispense with the’ passion of sexuality in its creations.
The transformation of the psychic energy of sexuality to the higher
purposive thought and conduct involved in genuine love or the spiritual
14
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15
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motive of &n enlightened good will has been central to the creative psychic
process involved in the highest forms of art, morals, and religion. Apart
from this transformation of sexuality into conscious emotion according to
some eliciting ideal, inner growth is impossible. For it is "the
incapacity to love" which robs mankind of its possibilities:
This world is empty to him alone who does not understand
how to direct his libido toward objects, and to render them
alive and beautiful for himself, for Beauty does not lie in
things but in the feelings that we give to them.'*'®
So from the unconscious tendency of sexuality there can be elicited into
self-consciousness by the proper symbolic ideal the emotional aspirations
involved in noble sentiment, aesthetic sensibility, creative apnreciation of
fineness in thought and conduct, and the transcendence of selfishness which
is essential to genuine altruism. How self-determination is involved in
the purposive control of this given emotional component of self-experience,
will be discussed in the section to follow.
b. Prospective aim and creative oersonality.
In the individual’s desire for a greater personality or "prospective
aim" Jung believes that there is the most important factor of self-creation.
Herein the field of choice given in self-experience of sexuality and the
will-to-power is acted upon by the self-determination of a creative
17
synthesis toward an ideal of psychic growth and moral autonomy. In
the investigation of this psychic transformation of emotional and puroosive
compulsions into the purposive realization of ideal values in self-conscious-
ness, in this interpretative principle in the process of self-creation
16
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"psychoanalysis" becomes "psychosynthesis."
This psychic need for an inner discipline and organization of
emotional desire and egoistic impulse is necessitated by the growth of
individuality in a developing self-consciousness. For man is not a
simple being whose immediate self-experience can be reduced to any one
psychic tendency; neither is an individual independent of the causal inter-
action of such underlying motives in his conscious thought and conduct.
The degree to which a person is free to choose the determinants of his
psychic destiny is relative to the purposive control of the complex
aggregate of strivings and desires embodied in the self-experience from
which his developing personality emerges. Personal creativity is relative
to the ideal of personality that elicits the realization of psychic
possibilities.
The way of successive assimilation reaches far beyond the cura-
tive results that concern the doctor. It leads in the end to
that distant goal (wrhich may have been the first urge of life),
the bringing into reality of the whole human being — that is,
individuation.
The symbol formation involves integration of emotional desires
according to ideals of psychic growth by which ideal value experience is
possible in the constitutive activity of self-creation. This greater
organization of self-consciousness by ideals is possible because of
inherited systems of psychic preparedness or "archtypes." Through these
"primordial images" the past and present environment conditions the human
psyche. This is illustrated in the interaction between personalities in
an aesthetic experience that is possible because of the function of this
18
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unconscious process. An artist feels an emotional intensity which he
embodies objectively in a wori of art. The beholder who genuinely appre-
ciates the work thus shares in the emotional intensity of the artist’s
experience. But this "sympathetic re-creation" in the self-experience of
the beholder is possible because the product of the artist’s imagination
has stimulated or elicited some counterpart of an "archtype" in the self-
consciousness to which the artistic symbol has appealed.
The artist seizes this image, and in the work of raising it from
the deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation with con-
scious values, thereby transforming its shape, until it can be
accepted by his contemporaries according to their powers.^
This psychological principle is not limited to the aesthetic ex-
perience. In the moral experience of persons capable of reason and ideal
value realization an imaginative ideal of personality is the rational
embodiment in self-consciousness of what is a universal "primordial image"
or "archtype" in "the deepest unconsciousness." Thought or conduct which
is consciously experienced as moral obligation in the light of this ideal
of perfection is an act of free choice; but the field of choice in which
personal creativity operates is rooted in this unconscious psychic energy so
utilized for an ideal purpose. As such the ideal of personality becomes
an "autonomous complex," which "affects the life ^italics min^J of the
. 20
personality through the emotions." Such ideal anticipation of future
possibilities in the imagination of the present is an indispensible con-
21
stitutent of a satisfactory and inwardly adjusted psychic life. It
19
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should be noted that a psychic adjustment is possible as a matter of mental
hygiene without this aspiration for ideal value experience. But such
would be not satisfactory for the person who is sensitive to a cuality of
higher purpose. For he finds an "indispensable constituent" of self-
consciousness in the emotional compulsions or spiritual appetites which no
22
genetic reduction can deny as given elements in his self-experience. To
continue with the exemplification of this essential psychological principle
in moral experience, the utilisation of this psychic energy is not a given
element in the feeling of obligation; but the psychic energy to be utilized
by the purposive control of rational integration is given. The utiliza-
tion depends upon the creativity of the individual's self-determination.
The choice of ideals elicits the constitutive emotions of sexual and
egoistical derivation. These embody psychic possibilities, through the
creative expression of which in thought and conduct "the prospective aim"
becomes a determining factor in individual destiny. So vital a process
23
involves a high degree of self-conscious activity. An empirical
illustration will make this fundamental principle more clear.
A man whose perseverance and self-determination has given him an
apparently insatiable desire for power ( not necessarily for actual physical
power) discovers that the underlying motive for most of his advice and
service to other people is really the desire to realize some measure of
control over their thought and conduct. This man in cuestion comes to
realize that as strong as his will is, it is not a good will. The sexual
22
See MS, 31.
23
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derivative of appreciation for the intrinsic value of other persons is not
sufficiently developed in his life. In seeking to make his self-determi-
nation a good will which does embody such a creative cuality of appreciation,
he swings too far to the other extreme. Whereas before his altruism was
really for his own "aesthetic" satisfaction, his attempt to be truly
self-sacrificing inhibits his critical judgment for deciding the best
possible solution to specific problems for those who depend to a great
extent upon his advice. His willingness to "lose himself" for others
really weakens the initiative and responsibility by which the other persons
concerned could maintain their personal dignity. The man becomes aware
of the unintelligent method by which he is doing as much harm as good. He
finally comes to the conclusion that he must find some rational principle
by which he might guide his altruism. His good will then becomes an
enlightened good will when he -selects and acknowledges for himself an ideal
of personality by which all his own thought and character is to be tested.
The sense of moral dignity that he feels in this purposive control of his
own ideal value experience gives him something v orth while to share with
others. So when persons come to him for advice or aid, he does not try
to become the controller of their thoughts and conduct; neither does he
weaken their own self-determination by doing for them what he should by
suggestion and guidance lead them to do for themselves. Rather he seeks
to stimulate the same feeling of spiritual dignity which is central to his
own moral experience. Then he is sharing an enlightened good will with
those whom he helps to meet prejudice and hatred writh understanding and
love, bigotry and dogmatism with open-mindedness and tolerance, diletantism
and social indifference with conviction and social responsibility. In
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brief, to satisfy his will-to-power was a value experience. So was his
attempt to satisfy his desire to sacrifice himself (a sexual derivative).
But it was not "until this man purposively controlled his moral experience
by a rational principle that he realised the ideal value experience or
"prospective aim" of an enlightened good will.
In the analysis of these tendencies derived from unconscious moti-
vation it should not be overlooked that the psychological method can offer
no prescriptions for conscious thought or conduct. There is an intrinsic
unioueness in ideal value experience which no observation of the causal
24
interaction between unconscious end conscious motives can really grasp.
In the case of the moral experience cited above, reason was a self-conscious
activity involving self-determination, even though the emotional desires,
as v.rell as the capacity for purpose, wrere given in the self-experience of
the "prospective aim." The selection of an ideal derived from given
intuitions and the conscious self-imposition of that acknowledged purpose,
are determinants in the process of self-creation.
A similar psychological analysis of the "prospective aim" function-
ing in enlightened spiritual experience could be offered. The genuine
loyalty and devotion to the eternal creative purpose as is represented in
the sincere humility of Job is such an exemplification. In this search
25
for God the "prospective aim" is realizing one of its rarest functions.
The same could be said of the sublimity of noble action v/hich great art
elicits. Psychological method can only describe the mental processes and
24
Cf. MMS, 176-177.
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the emotional symbols, however. For the essential intrinsic worth of
26
each of these ideal value experiences escapes genetic analysis.
This inherent purposiveness, which integrates emotional value
experience derivative from the unconscious sexual and egoistic tendencies,
embodies self-creation as a psychic potentiality. The self-determination
of personal creativity can be understood only in the light of a synoptic
investigation for which psychological methods are not adeouate. To
what degree does this psychic individuation function in the concrete
growth of personal unity? Or, to state the ouestion in a different form,
what is the metaphysical status or objective aspect (if any) of this
psychological principle or subjective appetite for self-creation?
26
See CAP, 225.
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B. Whitehead’s synthetic interpretation of the concrete growth of
personal unity.
1. Emergent personality.
7!
1
It is very important that the distinction made between immediate
experience and concrete existence in Whitehead’s account be clearly in mind
as this metaphysical investigation proceeds. Concrete existence can be
defined in terms of "the self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of
27
being one arising out of the composition of the many." But thought
about that concrete existence must begin with an analysis of the component
elements of the impressions of a postulated external world in the sensations
28
of immediate self-experience. The analytical investigation of this
external environment is the task of scientific research in which the
"working hypothesis" or postulated objective status of concrete existence
29
is tested for its rational consistency. "Thus the basis of all
probability and induction is the fact of an analogy between an environment
30
presupposed and an environment directly experienced."
In the interwoven connectedness (prehensions) of all the particular
occasions of existence, human occasions in the historic route of an individ-
ual personality are only rare instances. Nevertheless, a human person,
as a high grade actual entity, "has truck with the totality of things by
27
PR, 220.
28
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reason of its sheer actuality" even though this human self "has attained
its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis limited to its own
31
purposes." Thus human mentality is ontologically continuous with the
less specialized forms of concrete existence:
There is thus an analogy between the transference of energy
from particular occasion to particular occasion in physical
nature and the transference of affective tone, with its
emotional energy, from one occasion to another in human per-
sonality. The object-to-subject structure of human exoerience
is reproduced in physical nature by this vector relation of
particular to particular.
Conseouently, in seeking for a synthetic interpretation of this concrete
growth of personal unity emerging "from the complex energy, emotional and
purposeful, inherent in the subjective form of the final synthesis in which
33
each occasion completes itself," some self-consistent function must be
discovered. This same condition is reouired of the analytical investiga-
tion of concrete existence objectified in the external world.
What we know of external nature is wholly in terms of how the
various occasions in nature contribute to each other's natures.
The whole environment participates in the nature of each of its
occasions. Thus each occasion takes its initial form from the
character of its environment. Also the laws which condition each
environment merely express the general character of the occasions
composing that environment. This is the doctrine of theA 34definition of things in terms of their modes of functioning.
In seeking the "essence to the universe which forbids relationships
35
beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality," Whitehead has thus
31
32
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come to the ultimate orinci >le of his metaphysical monism.
For the modern view process, activity, and change re the
matters of fact. At any instant there is nothing. Each
instant is only a way of grouping matters of fact. Thus,
since there are no instants, conceived as simnle primary
entities, there is no nature at any instant. Thus, all
V'e interrelations of matters of fact must involve transition
in their essence. All realization involves implication
in the creative advance. 0®
The source of this systematic account is the concrete immediacy of self-
experience in which are given the data that are to be consistently and
inclusively interpreted accordin'; to coherent and generic principles. "By
this notion of 'interpretation’ I moan that everything of which we are
conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thou rht, shall have the
37
character of a particular instance of the general scheme." Apart from
this elucidation of self-experience it has been indicated that rational
interpretation is impossible. For "there is no bridge between together-
38
ness in experience and togetherness of the non-experiential sort." This
necessitates an indication of the essential generic notions which are central
to Y.hitehead's account of the concrete growth of personal unity.
In the self-experience of being one actual unity arising out of the
composition of many actual entities and many possibilities or eternal objects
as Whitehead calls the "media of actuality, whereby the how of each actual
39
occasion is determinate," of this operation of becoming, the term used
56
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as a generic description is that of "feeling." "We thus say that an
40
actual occasion is a concrescence effected by a process of feelings."
The form of unity in the Universe, as well as the becoming of each actual
entity, is this process of creation with it.? inherent creativity or
actualization of potentiality embodied in the eternal objects. The con-
crete existence of each actual entity depends upon its interaction with
the other actual entities it prehends in their concrete growth. The
creative advance does not destroy a transcended relation of object to
subject but reproduces and adds to it in the novel actuality. "This
passage of cause into the effect is the cumulative character of time. The
41
irreversibility of time depends upon this character." It is the inten-
tion of this study to investigate the implication of these generic notions
for the concrete growth of personal unity on the human level of experienced
self-creation. That this is fundamental in Whitehead's thought is
evident in the following:
The understanding of the Universe requires that we conceive
in their proper relation to each other the various roles,
of efficient causation, of teleological self-creation, and
of contemporary independence.^
For this organic metaphysics the concrete growth of personal unity
in a human self is accounted for by the generic notions of emergence and
subjective aim. In the case of the human self, reason as a function of
purposive control of emotional intensity (analogous to physical energy)
,
40
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43
is "operative in conditioning the subsequent course of nature." The
extent to which this purposive control is achieved is the degree of self-
44
determination realized in the self-creation of one's own personality.
The inescapable fact of "unique experiential togetherness" or
personal unity in self-experience should not be interpreted as an unchanging
subject of change. For it is in the becoming or "supersession" from
45
state to state that the self is internally constituted. The concrete
self-consciousness of a person capable of the function of reason is inte-
grated by this enduring conformation of purpose involving the physical
pole in memory and inheritance as well as the mental pole in volitional
46
activity and anticipation. It is by virtue of these conscious linkages
with the past and future that immediate self-experience maintains itself
as a unity-in-complexity.
Through the physical pole arises in self-experience the inheritance
of emotions and s.ense-perceptions as well as non-sensuous perceptions such
47
as the unity with the body and the immediate past of personal experience.
To say that the brain is the organ of memory does not imply that the brain
does the remembering or thinking or that the mind uses the brain in the
process. It simply means that in the brain are the physiological
43
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conditions of thinking in the same sense that the inherited tendencies
operating in the unconscious psyche causally interact with the mental
48
process of conscious discrimination. In thus rejecting the mechanistic
account of cerebration, Whitehead contends that present cerebration does
not produce a memory of the image of the past. What is thought to be
such, is rather an image in the present which is analogous with the image
produced in the past by cerebration functioning at that oast instance.
This physical pole of memory and inheritance is the function of efficient
causation. It is when it is analyzed by the mentality of a human person
capable of the function of reason, that conscious memory is produced.
Because of the irreversibility of time, "the image of the present is the
outcome of the gathering up of the true memory into the creativity of the
49
present." In the self's concern with the environment (physical and
psychical) is derived the emotional continuity with nature which is
enjoyed or immediately experienced throughout all life. This act of
memory is an efficient cause. For in the self's concern with its own
immediate experience of activity, memory, embodies the initiation of self-
creation:
It is never bare thought or bare existence that we are aware of.
I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes,
fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions — all of
them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my
nature. My unity — which is Descartes' 'I am' — is my process
of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of
feelings. The individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of
48
See page 64 of this thesis. Cf. AI, 347.
49
P6ICP, 62.
_—
t I ! j.
-*
a natural activity, as I shape the activities of the environment
into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and ye t. as
being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world. c
Just as the function of memory in the physical pole links the
self-unity of present immediacy with the past out of which this concrete
growth is constituted in its perpetual process of becoming and perishing,
so volitional mentality links "the utmost verge" of present self-experience
with the possibilities of future concrete growth. This volitional activity
functioning in the mental pole of self-experience is what Whitehead calls
"anticipation." This ideal foresight is embodied in the "subjective aim"
that "controls the becoming of a subject, is that subject feeling a
proposition with the subjective form of puroose to realise it in that
51
process of self-creation. In the case of a lo 'sr grade actual entity
such as an electron, for instance, such an anticipation is a blind physical
fact. But the conceptual activity of human self-conscious experience
transforms such an ideal into mental fact. In human self-experience
this given subjective unity of mental life is teleologically linked thus
with a possible ideal of personality to be actually realized in the future
53
as the exemplification of rational purpose in concrete growth.
In personal creativity of concrete growth is embodied the unity
of efficient and final causation. This is the account of emergent
personality.
50
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2. The superhuman reference of emergent personality.
The function of personal creativity, by virtue of which a human self-
consciousness emerges, is derived from and interacts with the wisdom of God's
54
immanent purpose. The essential character of this superhuman reference
can be best understood after a brief consideration of (i) God and the
world; (ii) the nature of God; and (iii) God's immanence with a human
person. Throughout this investigation it should be carefully noted that
"God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical nrinciples,
55
involved to save their collapse. He is their chief exemnlification.
"
For it is by virtue of God’s feeling, wisdom, and willing that his immanent
purpose functions in the creative advance.
In Whitehead' s notion of God's feeling is embodied God's "superject"
relation to the world:
The metaphysical doctrine here expounded finds the foundations
of the world in aesthetic experience, rather than —as with Kant —
in the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is there-
fore aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the
aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the
immanence of God. b
In this metaphysical relation of God to the world, in which appetitive
vision and physical enjoyment have ecual priority in individual processes
of self experience, permanence and flux are correlated in the creative
advance as God's unity of purpose integrates the multiplicity of fact.
Whitehead's emphasis upon the goodness of God is central to this
54
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notion of interaction between God and the world. For although God's wisdom
is the ground of rationality in the universe (even though his own existence
is the ultimate irrationality), nevertheless, the essential feature is that
God is the ultimate limitation and not the ground of the metaphysical
L
57
process. God's power is minimized in favour of his goodness. For
though God in his "primordial" function makes evil possible, in his
"consequent" function he is seeking to control evil and to conserve and
58
increase the good by his tenderness and wisdom. But if God be thought
of as the ultimate ground rather than the limitation of the metaphysical
process, "there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin
of all evil as well as all good:
He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must
therefore be ascribed its short-comings, as well as its suc-
cess. If he be conceived as the supreme ground of limitation,
it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil,
and to establish Reason "within her dominions supreme.
This postulate is derived from some exceptional elements in the self-
conscious experience of personal creativity — "those elements which may be
60
roughly classed together as religious and moral intuitions." God's
wisdom and love is an actual function in this concrete self-experience of
personal creativity "because the contemplation of our natures as enjoying
real feeling derived from the timeless source of all order, acouires that
6 ],
'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim."
57
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But the goodness of his creative function as a limitation of the world is
determined by his wisdom which is "analogous to the remorseless working of
62
things in Greek and Buddhist thought."
What then could be said to be the nature of God's immanent purpose
in the world? Although order and novelty are factors of creativity which
are given to God's subjective aim, the ordering of relevant possibilities
is dependent upon God's function as "the ore systematic, complete fact,
65
which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act." To see
the implication of God's relation to the world for a human person the
notions of God's "primordial" and "consequent" functions must be investi-
gated.
In the philosophy of organism creativity is considered to be the
ultimate process which is actual in virtue of its accidental embodiments
that characterize it. The entities which compose the world are the
temporal accidents which become actual in a particular instance of concrete
growth. But God is the primordial non-temporal accident of creativity.
"Viewed as primordial he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the
absolute wealth of potentiality. In this aspect, he is not before all
64
creation, but with all creation." Although God as primordial is not
actual in the sense of possessing fullness of feeling or consciousness,
nevertheless, it is this primordial function in ordering relevant eternal
62
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objects that makes possible the progress of the creative advance through-
65
out the universe. It is this function as the principle of concretion
that links timeless potentialities with temporal actualities such as a
human self-experience, for instance. Such would not be possible, if it
66
were not for this "divine element in the world." But on the other
hand this potentiality can be no more than the "intensification of formal
67
immediacy," and even though God's primordial nature is the absolute
standard of such intensity in self-experience, each person has from
alternative possibilities the choice of an ideal for growth which even
68
God himself could not wholly know. In an inward adjustment of one's
own value experience to God's value experience individual growth is
realized. In this sharing of an inexorable purpose, from which even God
can not deviate, human self-creation participates in the concretion of
69
the universe. What is the corresponding principle in God's conseouent
function?
I
According to Whitehead's notion of the consequent nature of God,
which evolves as the world evolves without derogation of his primordial
nature, the organic actualities in the orld obtain adeouate representation
in the divine nature. In his conseouent nature God is conserving the
highest values out of the immediate human experience of suffering, sorrow,
65
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tragedies, triumphs, and joys of the passing world in the creative advance.
The consecuent nature of God is his judgment of the world.
He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own
life. It is the judgment of tenderness which loses nothing
that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which
uses what in the temporal is mere wreckage .... God’s role
is not the combat of productive force with productive force,
of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the
patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his con-
ceptual harmonization. He does not create the world, he
saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world,
with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty,
and goodness.
So operates the process within God’s nature by which his infinity
is being realized. In sharing this consecuent nature with God a human
person in his individual self-realization is sharing in God's ideal value
experience in this world, which "is God in his function of the kingdom
71
of heaven." This is the ouest for "the culminating fact of conscious,
72
rational life." It would embody the perfect realization of ideal values
73
in which time "becomes the moving image of eternity." For the creative
cooperation of man with God's conseouent nature is to share the principle
of persuasion.
He is the binding element in the world. The consciousness
which is individual in us is universal in him: the love wliich
is partial in us is all-embracing in him. Apart from him there
could be no wrorld, because there c^uld be no adjustment of in-
dividuality. His purpose in the world is quality of attainment.
His purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant
' 70
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to the actual state of the world. Thus all attainment is im-
mortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are God in
the world as it is now. Every act leaves the world with a
deeper or a fainter impress of God. He then passes into his
next relation to the world with enlarged, or diminished, pres-
entation of ideal values. 4
In this interpretation of spiritual interaction Whitehead accounts for the
superhuman reference of emergent personality.
3. Transition from the process of being to the process of spiritual growth.
According to Jung the rational consciousness involved in personal
unity has emerged from an unconscious psychic disposition shaped by the
75
forces of heredity. Reflective self-consciousness is so constituted
that the analysis of the complicated psychic activities operating in this
process of being can never adeouately account for "a livin': and creative
76
human being as a unique personality." In his investigation of the
causal relations in psychic processes, moreover, Jung has come to the
conclusion that "it is an important principle of psychology that psychic
77
events are derivable." In other words, it is possible to formulate the
working hypothesis that a prospective aim integrates the emotional psychic
energy which is expressed in the sexual and will-to-power motives of
human thought and conduct. But it is necessary to recognize that the
personal growth itself, from which these psychological principles of explana-
tion are derived, this "creative aspect of life which finds its clearest
74
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79
expression in art baffles all attempts at rational formulation."
Since Jung has considered reason to be a testing and organizing
process, there must be some immediate experience that is giver: for the
mediate process of interpretation. Jung cites the concrete unity of self-
experience. This is "my mind, rich in images, that gives the world colour
and sound; and that real and most rational certainty which I call experience
is in its most simple form, a supremely complicated structure of mental
79
images." But within this same self-experience that suggests the object-
ive reality of the external world there are given the emotional and
purposive value aspirations which embody psychic energy. These indubitable
data in the given unity of the process of being are the spiritual appetites'
which crystalize in such attitudes as faith, hope, love, or insight.
These four highest achievements of human effort are so many gifts
of grace, which are neither to be taught or learned, neither given
nor taken, neither withheld nor reeamed, since they come through
experience which is something given
,
and therefore beyond the reach
of human caprice. Experiences cannot be made. They happen — yet
fortunately their independence of man's activity is not absolute
but relative. We can draw closer to them — that much lies within
our human reach. There are ways which bring us nearer to living
experiences, yet we should beware of calling these ways "methods!"
The very word has a deadening effect. The way to experience,
moreover, is anything but a clever trick; it is rather a veg^ure
which reouires us to commit ourselves with our whole being.
The ideal of personal growth to which the prospective aim refers is
as objective in the process of being as is the notion of an external world
for which the visual sensations furnish a clue. But the psychological
78
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method that discovers value intuitions given in self-experience is not
capable of estimating the quality of mind for the production of which the
given psychic factors are involved in the transformation of the libido.
We can only remark its important effect upon the conscious personality
from the fact that the change heightens the feeling for life and
maintains the flow of life, we :j?ust conclude that there is a peculiar
purposefulness inherent in it.
The psychological methods of inner adjustment such as "utilization” or
"sublimation" are important for analysis of value experience, but the ideal
of personal growth, which functions in transforming this psychic energy into
ideal value experience, can be only referred to as a quality of achieve-
ment beyond the subjective process. For the latter is always in the past;
whereas the process of being is such that personal creativity is ever
emerging into the future.
Psychic energy appears, when actual, in the specific dynamic
phenomena of the mind such as instinct, wishing, v'illing, affect,
attention, power of work, etc. These in fact make up th n psychic
forces. When potential, energy appears in specific acquisitions,
possibilities, aptitudes, attitudes, etc., which are its conditions. *
Since ideal endeavor is psychic energy which constitutes the universe just
as much as does the physical energy interpreted by the natural sciences,
there is a possible revelation of the nature of ultimate reality in the
working hypothesis of personal growth as a "venture which recuires us to
85
commit ourselves with our whole being." For though the mere value
experience disclosed in the subjective aspect of the process of being might
81
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be abstractly Interpreted as "specific acquisitions, oossibilities,
aptitudes, attitudes, etc., "the ideal of perfectibility to which the
spiritual appetites of the prospective aim refer is ever a direction of
becoming.
In this urge for the self-realization of a more enduring personality
the prospective aim involves a discipline and purposive control of the
sexual and egoistic tendencies given in self-experience.
The way of successive assimilation reaches far beyond the curative
results that concern the doctor. It leads in the end to that dis-
tant goal (which may have been the first urge of life) the bringing
into reality of the whole human being —that is, individuation. ^
Though an achievement of ideal value brings a sense of partial satisfaction,
the prospective aim is by its very nature the stimulus for ideal endeavor
that could never attain a final goal. No harmonious psychic adjustment is
possible, since each "successive assimilation" urges a higher coordination
of psychic energy. Although an ideal of perfectibility is implied in this
account of psychic growth, such an objective aspect of the universe can not
be affirmed without a coherent metaphysical interpretation of the concrete
growth of personal unity.
Creativeness, like the freedom of the will, contains a secret.
The psychologist can describe both these manifestations as processes,
but he can find no solution of the philosophical problems they
offer.
^
In the fundamental structure of actual existence, according to
84
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Whitehead, the concrete growth of personal unity is an integral part of
86
the process of creation, the purpose of which unifies the Universe.
Since individuality is constituted by the function of feeling, the meaning
of experience is "the self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of being
87
one arising out of the composition of the many." Even below the human
level the prehension or mode of interaction between the object and subject
of self-constitutive experience involves incipient puroosiveness. For the
intentional activity of the mental pole of all selves is a modifying agency
88
in the natural energy of which human mentality is only an extreme instance.
Consequently, emotional awareness is the mark of the enjoyment of being
actual for any self-experience whether it is human or non-human. "The
energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity enter-
89
tained in life."
The given emotional awareness of "the uniaue experiential unity"
that constitutes human self-experience is "the only strictly personal
90
society of which we have any direct discriminative intuition." Through
this psychological unit of self-experience the derivations of the bodily
functions, the immediate past, and the external world, are given for
conscious discrimination. Though the process by which these data are
given is the function of feeling, yet "there is no conscious knowledge
86
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91
apart from the intervention of mentality in the form of conceptual analysis."
The function of feeling the data of direct psychological experience is
interpreted by reason as indirect knowledge. In self-co piition "that oart
of the bodily event in respect to which cognitive mentality is associated,
is for itself the unit psychological field.
But this psychological field does not depend on its cognition;
so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted from its
self-cognition. ' Accordingly consciousness will be the function
of knowing. But what is known is already a prehension of aspects
of the one real universe. 9 "'
Self-knowledge is the rational interpretation of the given sense
and value intuitions of emotional self-experience. For "in every act of
experience there are objects for knowledge; but apart from the inclusion
of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no
93
knowledge." In the purposive function of reason the emotional intuitions
of "the unicue experiential unity" are "finally purged by consciousness with
94
the aid of the critical reason and the pragmatic appeal to consecuences.
"
It is this factor of reason, as a coherent interpretation and selective
control of the emotional and purposive intuitions of self-experience, that
furnishes the essential principle of self-knowledge. "The growth of
reason is the increasing importance of critical judgment in the discipline
95
of imaginative enjoyment."
91
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It was pointed out in the investigation of the process of knowing
that Whitehead escapes the skepticism of a dualistic epistemology by his
96
"appeal to ontology." In the texture of self-experience with its memory
of the past and anticipation of the future, efficient causation and the
possibility of knowledge receive a common explanation by an ideal of personal
97
growth. This is the "subjective aim, which controls the becoming of a
subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of
98
purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation." That this
ideal of personal growth not only is necessary for the process of knowing
but is also required for the process of being, is substantiated by
Whitehead's contention that we must define "natural facts, so as to under-
stand how mental occurences are operative in conditioning the subseouent
99
course of nature." The function of anticipation, as a conscious linkage
with the future, is to transform an ideal of the imagination into concrete
100
personal growth. In the concrete growth of personal unity toward an
ideal of perfectibility there is realized "some hidden, penetrating Truth
with a keenness beyond compare.
The type of Truth required for the final stretch of Beauty is
a discovery and not a recapitulation. The Truth that for such
an extremity of Beauty is wanted is that truth-relation whereby
Appearance summons up new resources of feeling from the depths
of Reality. It is a Truth of feeling, and not a Truth of verbali-
zation. The relata in Reality must lie below the stale presup-
96
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positions of verbal thought. The Truth of supreme Beauty lies
beyond the dictionary meanings of words.
For it is in the contrast between the actual self-experience of personal
creativity and the ideal of perfectibility in future growth that an aspect
* 102
of reality is discovered as the essence of rational self-consciousness.
This discovery is a quality of mind which harmonizes truth and value within
the unity of self-consciousness as the "supreme fusion" of the insistent
cravings of spiritual appetites such as intellectual curiosity, aesthetic
appreciation, moral loyalty, and mystical experience. "In the higher
organisms the differences between the mere emotions and conceptual experi-
103
ences produces a life tedium unless this supreme fusion has been effected."
Jung has suggested that the prospective aim can be explained only
in the light of an ideal of perfectibility in personal growth. But he
clearly recognizes the inadeouacy of a psychological method to furnish the
quality of achievement this inner adjustment implies. In dealing with
"the internal life which is the self-realization of existence," Whitehead
insists that the worth of life is to be found in the synoptic function of
104
reason as the purposive realization of ideal values.
This ideal of personal growth which both the psychological and
the metaphysical accounts imply is rooted in the process of being of which
it is an integral part. For "the characteristics of life are the absolute
101
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self-enjoyment, creative activity, aim. Here 'aim' evidently involves
the entertainment of the purely ideal so as to be directive of the
105
creative process." The progressive marks of the ideal of perfectibility
as it functions in spiritual growth are speculative venture, an enlightened
good will, and Peace. It is the concluding problem of our thesis to
make this ideal of personal growth explicit in regard to its meaning for
human thought and conduct.
105
NL, 28.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SYNOPTIC FUNCTION OF REASON IN THE PPOCESS OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH
A. The Faustian quest for spiritual satisfaction.
An ideal of perfectibility in personal growth is derived from intui-
tive experiences of emotional and purposive compulsions which are geneti-
cally prior to self-consciousness. Nevertheless, when this symbol of
spiritual aspiration is rationally criticized and consciously acknowledged,
m
it may transform mere desires into spiritual appetites for the purposive
realization of ideal values in a self-identical, self-conscious, and self-
determining personality. If the accounts of the teleological character
of the universe presented in this study have any validity, there is at
least one fundamental principle that must be affirmed. In the function of
ideal anticipation in personal creativity the future is in the making for
that particular person. But by the very nature of the process of
perfectibility no psychological method can analyze data which as yet are
forms of non-being. Neither can a rational metaphysical interpretation be
formulated without empirical evidence. Is there any method by which an
ideal of perfectibility that is held only in imagination but never
completely realized in fact might be investigated? Both Jung and Vhitehead
suggest the efficacy of the vision oroduced by the creative imagination of
a poet.
Jung's investigation of the undercurrents of psychic life influencing
both ancient and modem man has led him to the conclusion that in the poet
-.
.
.
1
as well as the seer, prophet, and sage t^ere is an insight into the
possibilities of spiritual growth which are of intrinsic v-lue for "modem
men in search of a soul."
The artist seizes his image, and in the work or raising it from
the deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation ith con-
scious values, thereby transforming its shape, until it can be
accepted by his contemporaries according to their powers.
^
Whitehead agrees that an ideal of perfectibility, by which personal
creativity is ever emerging into the future is disclosed in the poetic
rendering of our concrete experience:
Remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete exoerience, we
see at once that the element of value of being valuable, of having
value, of being an end in itself, of being something which is for
its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an event as
the most real concrete actual something. 'Value* is the word I
use for the intrinsic reality of an event. Value is an element
which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature.
We have only to transfer to the very texture of realization in
itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of human
life.
^
What artistic expression is relevant to this ideal of perfectibility
by the function of which personal growth is activity ever merging into the
future? Jung alludes to Goethe's Faust . Also the essence of the Faustian
ouest for spiritual satisfaction is identical with Whitehead's search for
some "grasp of the immensity of things, some purification of the emotions
by the understanding" as well as his suggestion that modem man must find
3
some "mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow/." Before discussing
the attitudes which characterize the Duality of mind elicited by the ideal
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of perfectibility, re must emphasize the generic character of the Faustian
quest in the thought of Jung and Whitehead. This will disclose the
relevance of the Faustian quest for spiritual satisfaction to the synoptic
function of reason as the purposive realization of ideal values.
The spiritual crisis which Goethe symbolized in Faust's unrespon-
siveness to the ringing of the Easter bells, is re-created today in the
aesthetic, intellectual, moral, and religious experience of many sincere
and enlightened persons. Feligious forms, which satisfied the soiritual
appetites comprising the "faith of our fathers," no longer elicit an
enduring and natural response that is emotionally and intellectually sat-
isfying. The conflict of emotional desires in the absence of a rational
criterion for determining ideal values only intensifies their despair.
Modern man is truly in search of a soul: he wants a spiritual ideal toward
which he might direct his highest aspirations and according to which he
4
might devote his concrete endeavor. The selection of Faust as the
embodiment of the ideal of perfectibility tc be considered in this discus-
sion, does not imply that the inner adjustment and transformation of
personality is any less exemplified in the spiritual vision of the Buddha
or of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane. But the capacity for analogy as
well as the applicability of the meaning of Faust in terms of modern man’s
need for an ideal of personal grovth, such direct relevance to the process
of perfectibility, has suggested this poetic representation of the "venture
which reouires us to commit ourselves with our whole being."
4
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abandonment of the old faith did not terminate his crest for the understand-
ing of tlie meaning for his existence. Rather he continued to seek for that
source in human experience from v.'hich the outworn expressions of belief
themselves had sprung. So, today, the rejection of traditional standards
or creeds does not in itself bring intellectual and spiritual freedom. What
is needed is a mental readjustment that incurs the responsibility for
sincere persons to seek a self-experience of ide'l values from which new
and more adeauate norms for ethical, aesthetic, religious, and intellectual
activity might be derived. How relevant is Goethe's vision?
In works of art of this nature — and we must never confuse them
with the artist as a person — we cannot doubt that the vision is
a genuine, primordial experience, regardless of what reason-mongers
may say. The vision is not something derived or secondary, and
it is not a symptom of something else. It is true symbolic ex-
pression, that is, the expression of something existent in its
own right but imperfectly known .... Through our feelings we
experience the known, but our intuitions point to things that are
unknown and hidden — that by their nature are secret .... Is
there something more purposeful than electrons? He [Goethej knows
that a purposiveness out-reaching human ends is the life-giving
secret for man.
If this vision is to have any meaning for one's own personal experience, the
ideal purpose of spiritual growth must be recreated as a dominant attitude
of mind. This is to allow the Faustian quest to integrate one's own
rational self-consciousness as it did Goethe's.
Then we understand the nature of his experience. We see that
he has dram upon the healing and redeeming forces of the col-
lective psyche that underlies consciousness with its isolation
and painful errors; that he has penetrated to the matrix of life
in which all men are embedded, which imparts a common rhythm to
all human existence, and allows the individual to communicate
7his feelings and his striving to mankind as a whole.
6
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This ideal of a "creative human being as a unique personality" is the
objective reference for the complicated psychic activities of emotion and
purpose embodied in the subjective prospective aim." It is the waywardness
of the general outlook of humanity today that makes the Faustian quest so
significant.
When conscious life is characterized by one-sidedness and by
a false attitude, then 'the Faustian ouesth is activated —one
might say, 'instinctively'— and comes to light in the dreams
of individuals and the visions of artists and seers, thus re-
storing the psychic ecuilibrium of the epoch.
But for modern man subjective adjustment is not sufficient in itself as a
basis of belief in an enduring meaning for the cualitv of mind he seeks.
There must be a correlation of metaphysical truth with psychological value,
if the Faustian euest is to furnish his thought and conduct an ideal of
perfectibility.
According to Whitehead the process of perfectibility depends upon
the nurture of "creative initiative towards the maintenance of objective
9
values." The essence of Foust, which is that life derives its worth from
the pursuit of higher and higher attainment rather than the achievement of
any final goal, is the poetic expression of Whitehead's view that the process
of being "receives its final quality, on which its worth depends, from the
10
internal life which is the self-realization of existence." This insight
is more than a transient refreshment:
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It is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's
self-attainment. It justifies itself both by its immediate en-
joyment, and also by its discipline of the inmost being. Its
discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of it.
It transforms the soul into the permanent realization of values
extending beyond its former self. L '
In this endless destiny of constant endeavor and aspiration is the high
adventure of the synoptic function of reason which cannot create the
given factors of existence but can come to understand and purposively to
control them. "Thus creativity with a purpose issues into the mental
12
creature conscious of an ideal." This is the vigorous self-assertion
inherent in the process of perfectibility from which a person derives his
"source of emotion, from which [he] inherits [his] puirooses, to which [he]
13
directs his passions." For it is the contrast between the actual self-
experience of personal creativity and the ideal of further growth that
constitutes the essence of rational self-consciousness. If a person is
to concretely experience this cuality of mind which emerges in personal
creativity, "adventure is essential, namely, the search for new perfec-
14
tions." In Faust's ceaseless striving Goethe expresses the insight
that he who would find freedom and meaning in life must search constantly
wit1 the understanding that no perfect achievement is ever possible. This
is what 'Whitehead considers to be the basis for all understanding of human
15
life, namely, "that no static maintenance of perfection is possible."
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The recognition of this activity of ideal value experience ever
merging into the future, by virtue of which uncertainty and tragedy are
always present, is the first step in the understanding of "how life includes
16
a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorro Such a "supreme fusion'
of emotional and intellectual appetites is necessary to justify the "insisten i
craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading
importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for ever-
17
more." It is of the very nature of the Faustian ouest that "the ideal
of something infinitely attractive and essentially inexhaustible — the
18
eternal feminine, as Goethe calls it — draws life on from stage to stage."
For hitehead this is the ideal of spiritual growth which is elicited by
one’s personal attitude of dissatisfaction. It is the factor in human life
"provocative of a noble discontent" which "emerges gradually into promin-
ence as a sense of criticism, founded upon appreciations of beauty, and of
19
intellectual distinction, and of duty." This coherent harmony of truth
and beauty within the immediate experience of self-consciousness was the
ouality of mind which Faust was seeking as he rejected all "image or
20
descriptions of reality and yearned to enact and to become reality itself."
Such is the discovery of that truth of feeling summoning up new resources
13
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from the depths of reality which discloses the inner aspect of spiritual
21
growth in the process of perfectibility. In short, the truth embodied
in spiritual autonomy is that of the purposive realization of ideal values
in a growing personality. That is the quality of mind which is "undying
22
by reason of its expression of perfections proper to our finite nature."
Whitehead insists that there is a tragic sense of life which must
characterize all sincere realization of spiritual growth:
As soon as high consciousness is reached, the enjoyment of
existence is entwined with pain, frustration, loss, tragedy.
Amid the passing of so much beauty, so much heroism, so much
daring, Peace then is the intuition of permanence. It keeps
vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy; and it sees the tragedy
as a living agent persuading the world to aim at a fineness
beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is
a disclosure of an ideal: —V.hat might have been, and was not:
What can be. The tragedy was not in vain. This survival
power in motive force, by reason of appeal to reserves of
Beauty, marks the difference betv/een tragic evil and the gross
evil. The inner feeling belonging to the grasp of the service
of tragedy is Peace — the purification of the emotions.
*
What for the quest of Faust would have been an enduring satisfaction, is
for Whitehead the realization of Peace, "a ouality of mind steady in its
24
reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things." Peace
is the concrete experience of the meaning of ultimate reality which can be
realized in personal gro?:th as the redemption from the destructive force
that today is "robbing life of its zest for adventure (andj spells the
21
See pages 89-90 of this thesis.
22
AI, 221.
23
AI, 369. Cf. Rodin’ s statue, The Soul and Body .
24
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decadence of civilization, by stripping from it the very reason for its
25
existence." But just as Faust sought the meaning of his existence in
the concrete activity of personal action rather than in abstract contem-
plation or introverted brooding, so Vihitehead warns those who would share
this Faustian spirit that Peace as an enduring satisfaction is not
"Anaesthesia." The experience of Peace "comes as a gift", when through
speculative venture and an enlightened good will there is ar inner adjust-
ment of relative values to an ideal of perfectibility. This is the
synoptic function of reason by which there is "a broadening of feeling due
to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet
26
momentous in its coordination of values." Before discussing the
coordinating principles in the generic process of spiritual growth (specu-
lative venture and an enlightened good will) it seems necessary to cite an
illustration of the applicability as well as the meaning of the Faustian
quest for spiritual satisfaction.
If the psychological and metaphysical principles presented in this
thesis have any rational validity, the chief problem of higher education,
whether secular or religious, is to furnish an insight of ideal purpose
for the spiritual growth of modern youth who is "in search of a soul."
Explanations about "rationalization, " as well as the neurotic character
of "aesthetic introversion," "moral mania", and "religious illusion",
furnish cynicism as a sophisticated camouflage of a secret but vital
25
AI, 377-378. Cf. Brightman’s "super-economic" and "economic"
distinction of value for the social implications of this Faustian ouest.
26
See AI, 367-368.
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27
yearning for some meaning in his existence. It is true that there are
some young people today that maintain a faith in their ideals for individ-
ual and social life. But in many cases they, too, have a secret. They
fear that their idealism masks an unrealistic interpretation of the
nature of things. For both types of young people the traditional standards
and modes of thought snc conduct have failed to elicit emotional and
intellectual satisfaction. There is an urgent need today, not only for
such explanations about experience, but also for some enduring purpose by
which mere existence acquires an ideal meaning for spiritual aspiration
and concrete endeavor. For if the spiritual growth of the Faustian ouest
can not be made a living reality in the value experience of the younger
generation, who can not much longer retain the husks along with the
rational oualities of their cultural heritage, then there seems no alterna-
tive to Krutch* s Modem Temper :
Formerly, ,a modem youth in search of a soul, believed even in his
darkest moments that the universe was rational, if he could only
grasp its rationality, but gradually he has come to suspect that
rationality is an attribute of himself alone and th c re is no reason
to suppose that his own life has any more meaning than that of the
humblest insect that crawls from one annihilation to another.
Nature in her blind thirst for life, has filled every possible
cranny of the rotting earth with some sort of fantastic creature,
and among these man is but one — perhaps the most miserable of
all, because he is the only one in whom the instinct of life falters
long enough to enable it to ask the auestion, "Why?"
As long as life is regarded as having been created, creating
may be held to imply purpose, but merely to have come into being
is, in all likelihood, merely to go out of it also.^
Futilitarianism is always a possible interoretation of ideal
aspiration. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this thesis that the
27
Cf. Freud, Santayana, Krutch, or Pareto.
28
Krutch, MT, 8-9.

indubitable tragic aspect of ideal value experience may have another
more probable meaning in the ontological process of perfectibility. On
this basis life is being created in the realization of the Faustian ouest!
For "the characteristics of life are absolute self-enjoyment, creative
activity, aim. Here ’aim* evidently involves the entertainment of the
29
purely ideal so as to be directive of the creative process." But the
tragedy is no less real. "As soon as high consciousness is reached, the
enjoyment of existence is entwined with pain, frustr. tion, loss, tragedy."
In the dialectic of ideal value experience the tragic frustration
of spiritual growth might be thought of as the thesis. The moral loyalty
and intellectual dignity of the Faustian ouest might be considered the
antithesis. Is it possible that the cntithesis might so transform the
thesis through the purposive function of reason that a new synthesis might
be achieved, that "mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow"?
Whitehead seems to believe that such a Quality of mind might be attained
as an enduring meaning for this experiential process:
The meaning of Perce is most clearly understood by considering
it in relation to the tragic issues which are essential to the
nature of things. Peace is the understanding of tragedy, and
at the same time its preservation."
In the mind of a modem youth in search of a soul is it possible to re-
create the Faustian quest for the purposive realization of ideal values?
The basis for hope lies in the process of spiritual growth.
50
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B. Speculative venture.
Whitehead contends that if reason is to be a decisive influence
in the life of humanity, there must be speculative venture as "the renewed
32
exercise of the creative iras^ination. " For the synoptic function of
reason is the product of wonder and intellectual curiosity. In so far as
direct evidence reveals, human beings seem to be the only subjects of
experience who are capable of or interested in a rational interpretation
of the given emotional and purposive compulsions of self-consciousness.
This adventure of thought, without which "man will cease to ascend in the
scale of being," has developed from superstition and magic to modern
science and philosophy. But much genuine mystery remains:
The task of reason is to fathom the deeper depths of the many-
sidedness of things. We must not expect simple answers to
far-reaching questions. However far our gaze penetrates, there
are always heights beyond which block our vision .
^
It is the task of speculative philosophy to explore the clues of
ultimate meaning given in the intuitions of emotion and purpose. As the
"direct elucidation of first-hand experience" this interpretation by
"fundamental notions is merely for the purpose of disclosing their coherence
their compatibility, and the specializations which can be derived from
54
their conjunction." These generic principles can never be absolutely
affirmed as true; but their coherence is an ideal of explanation and
32
SMW, 299. Cf. AI, 105.
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ultimate meaning, in the light of which any claims to truth are tested for
their rational probability.
There is no first principle which is in itself unknowable,
not to be captured by a flash of insight. But, putting aside
the difficulties of language, deficiency in imaginative pene-
tration forbids progress in any form other than that of an
asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only definable
in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy.
^
There are two essential aspects of this speculative venture that have
special significance for the Faustian quest. The first is the refutation
of the epistemological relativism based on the assumption that there are no
first principles accessible for the human mind. The second point that
must be emphasized is the manner in which ultimate meaning is accessible
through spiritual growth.
Throughout this entire investigation skeptical uncertainty, as
inherent in the process of knowing, has been a constant threat against
rationality. As a theoretical possibility this agnostic contention is
consistent with the epistemological dualism upon which the whole methodol-
ogical perspective of this study is based. Furthermore, by the very ideal
nature of the criterion of coherence "as the great preservative of ration-
alistic sanity" absolute certainty has been seen to be impossible. This
pertains not only to working hypotheses by which science reconstructs the
given sense reactions of the self to its physical existence into an
objective external world: but the postulate of probability is the same for
the principles of self-cognition by which emotional and purposive aspiration

105 .
56
are elicited and controlled by an ideal of personal growth. Error and
as-yet~unexplained causes of observed effects in scientific inouiry recuire
! a synoptic function of reason as a rational faith in probability. So
i
does the tragic frustration of ideal aspiration necessitate an "ultimate
I
moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action — that it should
37
I embody an adventure of hope." Furthermore, the denial of the validity
i of any knowledge requires some rationality and as self-refuting, "has no
33
message for those who hold that thought does count."
The second aspect of the speculative venture that needs emphasis
is the manner in which the meaning of ultimate reality car be concretely
experienced in a rational consciousness of ideal value experience. For
"there is no first princiole which is in itself unknowable, not to be
39
caotured by a flash of insight." But such ultimate intuitions into the
nature of the universe depend upon a rational individual experience of God's
immanent purpose in a person's spiritual growth.
The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine
that there is a principle of concretion which is not discover-
able by abstract reason. What further can be known about God
must be sought in the region of particular experiences, end
therefore rests on an empirical basis.
^
^This is the truth of discovery that "summons up new resources of feeling
i from the depths of reality" so that in the concrete interpenetration of
See NL, 40, SME, 18-19, SMW, 216-217, AI, 278-279, PR, 270 and
FOR, 5. Cf. MMS, 107.
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truth end value within the immediate experience of a person's rational
consciousness a spiritual duality of mind is achieved. "The value
realized in the mental occasion is knowledge-value . . . .Thus the
creativity with a purpose issues into the mental creature conscious of an
41
ideal." This is the truth embodied in the conformation of Appearance
to Reality. For the pursuit of an ideal of personal growth "brings into
our consciousness that permanent side of the universe which we can care for
It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, for our own existence,
42
a meaning which flows from the nature of things." Consecuently, in
the synoptic function of reason an ideal of coherence is relative to an
ideal of personal growth in which the selective activity of reason gen-
erates the insight into the deeper sources of ideal value experience that
discloses the Divine Persuasion immanent in the process of perfectibility.
For the discoveries that are made by the speculative venture are "insight
and foresight, and a sense of the worth of life, in short, that sense of
43
importance which nerves all civilized effort." Since self-experience
is personal creativity ever emerging into the future, insight into the
nature of ultimate reality demands the vision of creative imagination by
which the progress of science, art, philosophy, and religion "evolve
44
notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality." In the
concrete experience of an enlightened good will is revealed a creative
41
RIM, 118-119. Cf. AI, 309, 541, and 343.
42
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purpose in which the emotions are transformed by the understanding. Its
j
essence is the moral loyalty that motivates the Faustian ouest. This is
i
the "Truth of supreme Beauty ^thatj lies beyond the dictionary meanings of
45
words.
"
C. An enlightened good will.
In moral loyalty there is "a conversion of intellectual insight into
46
an emotional force." The Quality of mind that is achieved through the
concrete experience of an enlightened good will is a spiritual dignity for
the preservation of which all thought and conduct must embody "a oenetrating
47
sincerity." For this essential attitude motivates a person to appreciate
48
the "value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other." It
requires .an organic union of self-determination (will-to-power) and self-
sacrifice (sexuality) in the coordination of personal attitudes that direct
one's interest beyond mere individual values. This "sublimation of the
egoistic aim by its inclusion of the transcendent whole" is tVc supreme
insight of creative ourrose as "the indwelling persuasion towards the
49
harmony which is the height of existence." So to maintain an enlightened
j
good will in the face of force and unideal compulsion is to incarnate in
45
AI, 343.»
46
PR, 23. Cf. PR, 339.
47
See AI, 346,
,
368, and RIM, 15. Cf. Jung, CAP, 98: "It is a remark-
able fact that a life lived entirely from the ego usually affects not only
the person, but observers also as being dull. The fullness of life reouires
more than just an ego; it demands spirit, that is an independent overruling
coraolex which is apparently alone capable of calling into living expression
all those mental possibilities that the ego-consciousness can not reach."
48
RIM, 59.
49
AI, 380 and AI, 86.

one’s spiritual growth the creative principle of the universe.
In the Faustian quest the moral interest in th» conservation and
increase of social values is born of a union of self-control and sensitivity
to the frustration of value in the lives of others. By virtue of a consciou
ness of social responsibility a person shares the spiritual love of God
whose principle of persuasion functions in human experience. For there is
generated a transforming eouilibrium of spiritual poise when a person meets
injustice with understanding, prejudice with tolerance, hatred with love,
and social indifference with unselfish responsibility. In this higher unity
that all mutual respect of personal worth should be is that Godlike quality
of mind which elicits generosity and noble action. By rendering service to
another individual one’s sincerity must be enlightened or what is intended
to help another may stifle his initiative and responsibility and so dwarf
his spiritual stature. For when a person loves his fellowman with "a
penetrating sincerity," he will try to re-create the Faustian cuest in his
friend’s experience so as to produce Godlike poise and creative power. Such
an enlightened good will is becoming the spiritual dignity of a free and
rational devotion to the ideal of personal growth.
This bond is the growth of reverence for that power in virtue of
which nature harbours ideal ends, and produces individual beings
capable of conscious discrinination of such ends. This reverence
is the foundation of the respect for man as man. It thereby secures
that liberty of thought and action, required for the upward ad-
venture of life on this Earth.''
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D. Peace.
The factors in personal experience that have nurtured the "noble
discontent" of the Faustian quest have been seen to be a speculative
venture and an enlightened good will. The motive force in this process
of perfectibility has been a moral loyalty to a self-imposed creative
purpose of personal growth. Yet there is a still higher grandeur of achieve
ment in that "quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is
51
treasured in the nature of things." But such a realization of Peace
does not in the least minimize the intrinsic value of speculative venture
or an enlightened good will. For it is in the exemplification of the
Faustian quest, as a personal response to these spiritual appetites through
ideal aspiration and concrete endeavor, that there "comes as a gift" the
coordination and "harmony of the soul’s activities with ideal aims that lie
52
beyond any personal satisfaction."
Since mere personal creativity cannot cuench the emotional and
intellectual thirst of man’s soul, he seeks beyond the merely human to the
superhuman purpose which will unify his life as an enduring fellowship and
communion with God. Such a vision of truth, beauty, and goodness, by
which God saves the world through the patient operation of persuasive
rationality, elicits "a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged with
the motive force of mutual love." But his is no abandonment of the Faustiar
quest. For "the worship of God is hot a rule of safety — it is an
51
Ibid.
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adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable. The death of
53
religion comes with the repression of the high hope of adventure.” It
is the aspiration to share with God the eternal puroose of perfecting value
in the universe. For if God is to be worthy of worship, he must embody
what man has considered to be deepest within himself, namely, the self-
acknowledgment of an ideal of perfection which is beyond any possibility of
final achievement. So it is with "penetrating sincerity" that a consecrated
person desires to understand the spiritual determinants of his destiny, even
if knowledge is liable to destroy the illusions by which existence can be
complacently endured. For in worship is the challenge of perfectibility
which is"derived from the direct intuition that life can be grounded upon
its absorption in what is changeless amid change .... It is the recon-
54
ciliation of freedom with the compulsion of truth." The vitality of a
person's spiritual growth depends upon the faith that his ideal purpose is
interacting with that of an understanding Companion whose ideal of
55
perfectibility pertains to the universe as a whole. It is this adjust-
ment of the Faustian ouest which generates the faith that the spiritual
dignity of an enlightened good will has an objective meaning in the universe.
But to concretely experience this enduring meaning a person must, first,
recognize the true nature of the process of perfectibility throughout
eternity; and, in the second place, he must achieve that Godlike quality
of mind for which a vision of eternal striving will have an enduring appeal.
53
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In the dialectic of ideal value experience this moral loyalty and intel-
lectual insight is the antithesis by which the tragic frustration of
spiritual growth, the thesis, might be transformed. The understanding of
Peace is the synthesis, ’’the mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or
sorrow.
"
Whitehead explicitly rejects the conception of the universe as
capable of final .perfection:
The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure
chaos is intrinsically impossible. At the other end of the
scale, the immensity of the world negatives the belief that
any state of order can be so established that beyond it there
can be no progress. 5®
That this Divine Purpose will never be completely realized does not detract
from but increases the intrinsic worth of the Faustian quest. The
synoptic function of reason accordingly seeks a vital contact with the
essential tragedy, conflict, striving, and growth of life itself. Be-
coming is ultimate. So notions of a beginning or a termination of the
task of the Divine Persuasion are meaningless abstractions from concrete
experience. Though God makes spiritual pro th possible, the realize tion
of ideal values is the self-determined function by which a person cooperates
in the process of creating his own being. Thus man and God creatively
cooperate in the transformation of tragic frustration into higher spiritual
57
growth. There is no evading the possibility that this Divine quest
may fail; but even so, such an opportunity for participating in the eternal
56
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process of perfectibility appeals to the Godlike ouality of mind that a
sincere person can achieve in the Faustian auest. It is the personal
responsibility to realize this aspiration in concrete endeavor that
generates a sense of Peace. For Peace is the broadening of feeling by
virtue of metaphysical insight, the essence 'of which is that "the individual
whose strength of experience is founded upon this ultimate intuition, there-
58
by is extending the influence of the source of all order." This un-
verbalized coordination of ideal value experience is the duality of attain-
ment sought by God’s purpose in the world. "For in this way the World
receives its persuasion towards such perfections as are possible for its
59
diverse occasions."
There may be a God, who, like the Zeus defied by Prometheus, enjoys
"the tremulous offerings of fools^hope deluded." But if such a God there
be, it seems consistent with the dignity of a person who is consecrated by
the Faustian quest, to defy such a Being and willingly take the conseouences
But the God whose enlightened good will is shared in the orocess of
spiritual growth is not so conceived, and fellowship with him is an
enduring realization. It does not in any sense involve rewrard, punishment,
or substitution of Divine aid for human labor. Rather this spiritual
yearning for God’s presence is a vital force in a person’s life by virtue
of which any frustration of value can be met with spiritual dignity. For
the tragedy itself is a "living agent persuading the world to aim at
58
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fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact." Life can not be
a mere barren and fruitless existence when it is so abundantly experienced.
For every moment is shared with God in seeking to perpetuate the "moving
image of eternity." To respond to the flashes of Divine Persuasion that
are infrequent but most significant, is to coordinate personal growth with
God’s eternal purpose. It is to incarnate in one's soul the spiritual
meaning of ultimate reality. For only to a person who has achieved
Godlikeness through the moral loyalty and speculative venture of an enlight-
ened good will would this vision of eternal perfectibility have any appeal.
"Such conformation of purpose to an ideal beyond personal limitations, is
the conception of that Peace with which the wise man can face his fate,
61
master of his soul."
In this supreme insight there is attained a union of personal free-
dom with God's creative ourpose in the "indwelling persuasion towards the
62
harmony which is the height of existence." Just as the Divine Love is
represented by Goethe as coming down from above to save the ever higher and
purer soul that Faust was achieving in. his noble discontent, so could the
angels sing of any person who shares this spiritual ouest:
Who ever aspiring, exerts himself,
Him can we redeem.
'
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DIGEST
The essence of the problem investigated in this thesis has been
the purposive transformation of mere human desires to the rational spiritual
appetites of a self-identical, self-conscious, and self-determining person-
ality.
In the analytical study of the process of knowing it has been
suggested that the key principle of self-knowledge is the purposive function
of reason in the Selective analysis and the interpretative synthesis of
the evidence given in immediate self-experience. Although an ideal is
derived from an intuitive experience of emotional and purposive compulsion
genetically prior to self-consciousness, a symbol of aspiration becomes a
rational principle for thought and conduct only when it has been consciously
recognized or acknowledged as such. In that recognition the future is in
the making, since the process of knowing can not be abstracted from the
emergence of active existence into the future. Faced by the problem of
skepticism it has been necessary to transfer the focus from the process of
knowing to the process of being. For it has been discovered that the
rational probability of self-knowledge can not be affirmed or denied until
j
the genetic analysis of psychic tendencies and a synthetic interpretation
j
of the concrete growth of personal unity have been investigated. This
required the testing an ideal of a total personality for the realization of
which the process of reason is a purposive function.
In the study of Jung’s analysis of the psychic factors involved in
-,
.
'
the process of self-creation this conclusion was reached. An inherent
purposiveness which integrates emotional value experience derivative from
the unconscious sexual and egoistic tendencies, embodies ideal value
experience as a psychic potentiality. But the eelf-determination, by
which psychic energy may be actualized in personal creativity, can be
understood only in the light of a synoptic investigation. For this asoect
of the study psycholo ical methods ^rp not '‘denuate.
In Vshitehead's organic metaphysics the synthetic interpretation of
the concrete growth of personal unity is based upon the generic notions
of emergence and subjective aim. Whereas the function of memory links
the self-unity of present immediacy with the past out of which this concrete
growth is constituted in its perpetual process of becoming and perishing;
so volitional mentality links the utmost verge of present self-experience
with the possibilities of future psychic growth. In this volitional
activity of the mental pole the uniaue self-unity is linked with an ideal
of personality, the progressive realization of which is the exemplification
of rational purpose in concrete growth of the universe. In this oersonal
creativity is embodied the interaction of efficient and final causation.
Such is the notion of emergent personality.
Besides the primordial function of concretion by which God
integrates th.e concrete growth of the universe there is his consecuent
function in which man’s ideal value experience can participate. God's
immanent purpose in the world of achieving a quality of attainment is thus
relatively dependent upon personal creativity. It allows the opportunity
by v.'hich a person can coooerate with God through sharing the principle of
persuasion. This is the superhuman reference of emergent ocrsonality.
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In the ouest of the synoptic function of reason in the purposive
control of ideal value realization it is only to such a person who has
attained some decree of Godlikeness that the vision of eternal perfectibility
would appeal. The tragic peace of the Divine Persuasion is embodied in
the principles of love and dignity operating in the transformation of
personal creativity. To regulate this spiritual growth i c the highest
function of reason.
Thus the enduring meaning of personal creativity is not a universal
and necessary principle independent of a given self-experience. Rather
this quality of attainment is a self-determined attitude of mind contingent
to the psychic adjustment of mere desires to an autonomous ideal of person-
ality. The imperative demands of the goal of perfectibility are rooted
in the self-imposed character of its acknowledgment . A concrete spiritual
growth toward this intrinsic ideal, which is inherently rational and
valuable in the very nature of things, is actualized in accordance with
the creative cultivation and abiding satisfaction of spiritual appetites.
In a person’s self-conscious experience mere value is purposively trans-
formed into ideal value in the progressive realization of such desires
as intellectual curiosity, aesthetic appreciation, an enlightened good
will, and the sh ring of the Divine Persuasion toward eternal perfectibility.
Thus personal creativity is exemplified in the synoptic function of reason
which is the Faustian ouest.
t
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